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ABSTRACT 
How does body armor and posture affect Soldier marksmanship?  The 
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) has significantly improved Soldier combat 
survivability, but in what ways does it change rifleman lethality?  Moreover, can 
we model these effects so as to develop better tactics and operational plans?  
This study quantifies the effects of Soldier equipment on lethality through multi-
factor logistic regression using data from range experiments with the 1st Brigade, 
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Riley, Kansas.   
The designed experiment of this study estimates the probability of a 
qualified US rifleman hitting a human target.  It uses the rifleman’s equipment, 
posture, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), and experience along with the 
target’s distance, time exposure and silhouette presentation as input factors.  
The resulting family of mathematical models provides a Probability of Hit 
prediction tailored to a shooter-target scenario. 
 The study shows that for targets closer than 150 meters, Soldiers shot 
better while wearing body armor than they did without.  Body armor had a 
negative effect for targets farther than 200 meters, and this could significantly 
impact the employment of the Squad Designated Marksman.  The study also 
shows that the kneeling posture is an effective technique and recommends 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A.  BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The Global War on Terrorism has reintroduced the rifleman as the 
predominate offensive system against an elusive threat.  To improve the 
performance of the individual rifleman, the US Army introduced an initiative 
called Soldier as a System (SaaS) / Soldier Enhancement Program.  A key 
component in improving Soldier systems is modeling and simulation.  The US 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center – (TRAC) listed several 
knowledge voids in current Soldier modeling and simulation capabilities (Solider 
MAWG, 2004).  One of these areas is “to represent the effects of different firing 
positions on engagement accuracy.” This gap became the focus of the study—
quantify the effects of posture, body armor and other individual equipment on 
rifleman lethality.   
The study addresses two specific questions regarding equipment and 
posture.  First, how does body armor affect a rifleman’s probability of hit, and 
how does this affect the employment of the Squad Designated Marksman?  
Second, how effective are the Kneeling and Standing postures compared to the 
standard Foxhole and Prone postures, and is there a potential benefit in 
conducting standardized training on these postures? 
The analysis uses data from experiments conducted on an automated 
Qualification Record Fire range at Fort Riley, Kansas.  The experiment consisted 
of Soldiers firing qualification tables using different postures while either wearing 
or not wearing Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The experiment covered four 
different firing postures.  The two primary postures were the Foxhole Supported 
Position and the Prone Unsupported Position.  The two alternate postures were 
the Kneeling Position and the Standing Position.  The study used a total of 10 
different firing scenarios, both day and night.  Each of the 29,005 observations 
from 466 soldiers contains over 40 possible explanatory variables. 
  xviii
B.  EFFECTS OF BODY ARMOR 
As seen in Figure 1, in target ranges from 50 to 150 meters, those 
Soldiers wearing IBA actually shoot better than those without IBA.  This 
advantage, however, diminishes as the distance increases.  At 200 meters, 
riflemen not wearing IBA shoot better than those wearing it.  The negative effect 
of IBA at longer ranges may have impacts on the Squad Designated Marksman 
(SDM).  The data suggests that the SDM might be more effective without full 
body armor.   






























PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
By Body Armor - Day Prone Tables Only
 
Figure 1.   PH by Range and Body Armor Type 
 
C.  PROBABILITY OF HIT BY FIRING POSTURE 
As seen in Figure 2, there is a marked difference in the Probabilities of Hit 
between postures.  The more stable postures, such as Foxhole Supported, are 
inherently more accurate than an unstable position, such as Standing or 
Kneeling.  The chart shows the same decrease in PH as the target distance 
increases.  The Kneeling posture, while less accurate than the traditional Prone 
  xix
or Foxhole postures, is still an effective posture at longer ranges.  The Soldiers 
conducting the experiment had no formal training in this posture, and it is very 
likely the PH for Kneeling would improve with formal training.  The Standing 
posture, in contrast, has a precipitous drop in PH in the short ranges and does 
not look to be effective at ranges beyond 50 meters. 
 














































Figure 2.   Probability of Hit by Posture 
 
D.  MODELING PROBABILITY OF HIT 
The study constructs a family of models that estimates a rifleman’s 
Probability of Hit for a specific target scenario.  To predict the Probability of Hit, 
multivariate logistic regression models use interactions between shooter’s 
equipment, posture, rank, and experience; the target size and distance; in 
addition to environmental conditions.  The result is a family of models containing 
from 1 to 160 predictor variables that account for various levels of variation in the 








but can be useful in larger simulations to demonstrate how those interactions 
may impact unit effectiveness. 
E.  IMPACTS OF FINDINGS 
1. Body Armor and the Squad Designated Marksman 
The data suggest that at ranges beyond 200 meters, current body armor 
has a negative impact on SDM lethality.  Methods of correcting this include 
modifying the equipment and/or the marksmanship training.  This study 
recommends modifying the IBA to better stabilize the rifle buttstock, and 
recommends formal training while wearing body armory.  In either case, the 
impact of body armor on SDM effectiveness warrants further research. 
2. Kneeling Posture as an Alternate Posture 
Soldiers firing the Kneeling posture have a Probability of Hit that is less 
than but comparable to the Prone or Foxhole postures.  There is potential that 
the Kneeling posture, when fully trained, may offer equal lethality with better 
mobility over traditionally trained postures.  The study recommends incorporating 
the Kneeling posture into standard rifle qualification.  The study found that 
Soldiers are using Kneeling posture in actual combat, but they rarely train on this 
posture prior to deployment.  The subject deserves more research on developing 
Kneeling marksmanship and how this training translates into rifle qualification 
standards. 
3. Other Findings 
The study finds no significant difference between the standard ironsight 
and the M68 Close Combat Optic.  The data show no statistical differences 
between the M16 and M4 weapons.  The M4 is less accurate at all ranges.  
These differences may or may not be practically significant.  Additionally, the 
study finds no significant difference in the Probability of Hit for Combat Arms and 
Combat Support or Service Support MOSs.  Lastly, the ACH helmet appears to 
have negative effects on Probability of Hit, but the findings are heavily dependent 
on other factors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations and they are the 
most-deployed system in this global war on terrorism.  As such, we 
must continue to properly equip and train them for the difficult 
mission they face.  To better accomplish this task, the Army has 
initiated two overarching steps—Soldier as a System (SaaS) and 
the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI)   
(Durr and Liberstat, 2004) 
This chapter 
• Describes the origins of the study. 
• Discusses how this study supports current simulation development. 
• Identifies possible benefits provided by the study. 
• Describes the general structure of the thesis. 
 
A. OVERVIEW  
Current operations in Southwest Asia have changed both the strategy and 
focus of the United States military.  Enemy tactics and terrain reintroduced the 
rifleman as the predominate system of force against an elusive terrorist threat.  
To improve the performance of the individual rifleman, the US Army introduced 
an initiative called Soldier as a System (SaaS) / Soldier Enhancement Program.  
This initiative has the goal “to improve the lethality, survivability, command and 
control, mobility, and sustainability for all Soldiers…which can be adopted and 
provided to Soldiers in three years or less.” (PEO Soldier, 2005)  A key 
component in improving Soldier systems is modeling and simulation. 
Modeling the effects of individual Soldiers in combat is an extremely 
complex and arduous task.  The US Department of Defense (DoD) has used 
complex models and simulations for decades to form strategy and policy, but 
modeling the individual combatant is relatively new.  Until recently, modeling the 
Soldier and his effects in large-scale models were either beyond computational 
capabilities or determined to be negligible.  Several current Department of the 
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Army simulations—One Semi-Autonomous Forces (OneSAF), Combined Arms 
Analysis Tool for the 21st Century (COMBAT XXI), and Infantry Warrior 
Simulation (IWARS)―are in the process of building high resolution simulations 
that include individual Soldier entities.  Simulations such as these seek not only 
to demonstrate the effects of individual combatants, but also to improve the 
tactics for current and future combat.  
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
1. Knowledge Gaps 
The US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center – 
(TRAC), one of this study’s sponsors, is the proponent of the Soldier Modeling 
and Analysis Working Group (MAWG), a cross agency organization of TRAC that 
identifies “future development and use of modeling and simulation (M&S) to 
support Soldier and small unit decision issues” (TRAC-WSMR –TR-04-009).  
Their Evaluation Report of March 2004 stated: 
Data is needed to represent the effects of different firing positions 
on engagement accuracy.  A Soldier’s accuracy is greatly affected 
by his firing posture and the weapons platform.  A Soldier firing 
from a standing position is inherently less accurate than a Soldier 
firing from a more stable prone position.  No model assessed 
accounts for the effects of different firing positions (standing, 
kneeling, prone, etc.).  Numerous data voids exist for critical 
weapon/sensor parings.  For example: PH for M4 with … the close 
combat optic in daylight. 
These knowledge gaps guided the study’s hypothesis and scope.  This 
study also seeks to answer two specific questions regarding equipment and 
posture.  First, does body armor affect a rifleman’s probability of hit, and how 
does this affect the employment of the Squad Designated Marksman?  Second, 
how effective are the Kneeling and Standing postures compared to the standard 
Foxhole and Prone postures.  Are there potential benefits in conducting 
standardized training on these postures? 
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(a) Squad Designated Marksman 
The Squad Designated Marksman (SDM) is a relatively new 
addition to the basic rifle squad and platoon.  According to Army Field Manual 3-
22.9:  
The primary mission of the SDM is to deploy as a member of the 
rifle squad. The SDM is a vital member of his individual squad and 
not a squad sniper. … The SDM has neither the equipment nor 
training to operate individually or in a small team to engage targets 
at extended ranges with precision fires.  The secondary mission of 
the SDM is to engage key targets from 300 to 500 meters with 
effective, well-aimed fires using the standard weapon system and 
standard ammunition. He may or may not be equipped with an 
optic. 
As stated, the SDM will not have the equipment to operate alone, 
but is expected to engage targets at 300 to 500 meters.  If the SDM’s 
effectiveness is critical to the success of his unit, is there equipment he should or 
should not carry? 
(b) Alternate Firing Postures 
Posture is another area this study seeks to quantify. The Army 
conducts basic rifle marksmanship training on only two firing postures, the 
Foxhole Supported and the Prone Unsupported firing postures.  Alternate firing 
positions, such as Kneeling and unsupported Standing, are infrequently 
employed in standard Army doctrine, but are gaining popularity among Soldiers 
as they provide better mobility during an offensive operation, especially in urban 
terrain (see Appendix C).  Kneeling and Standing postures use the body armor’s 
protection better than the Prone posture because they keep the torso—and thus  
the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI)—facing the enemy.  They are also offer 
better mobility than the Prone.  Advancing from position to position in the Prone 
is suitable for vegetated rural terrain, but it is less suitable when maneuvering 
through the rubble, broken glass, and concrete of urban terrain.  How do the 
Probabilities of Hit for Kneeling and Standing postures compare to those of 
Prone and Foxhole? 
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2. Modeling Concept 
What type of model best predicts Probability of Hit: physics-based or a 
statistics-based model.  An accurate physics-based model of rifleman engaging a 
target is extremely difficult.  It requires movement measurements of every joint in 
a Soldier’s body, calculation of how those movements affect rifle stability, and 
precise modeling of the bullet along its trajectory to the target.  A physics-based 
model would also need to account for the wind and air resistance effects on the 
trajectory.  Given the time and resources available, the combination of these 
tasks would be infeasible for this study. 
On the other hand, a statistical model using observational data allows 
inclusion of the factors we can measure and leaves those we cannot to the 
effects of random error.  With a large sample, one can construct a model that is 
both flexible to known factors yet stochastically accurate to unknown or 
undesired factors.  The model would predict the probability of a shooter 
successfully hitting a target at a set distance.  A parent simulation could use 
those probabilities to determine the outcome of rifle engagements. 
The model offers the same prediction benefits that a weather forecaster 
provides.  A forecaster cannot unerringly predict whether a viewer in a precise 
location will see precipitation in a particular day.  The meteorological models can, 
however, provide a probability of precipitation.  If an area receives rain on 20% of 
the days in a year and every day the forecaster predicts a 20% chance of rain, 
the model is accurate, but not precise.  If the meteorologist predicts, based on 
weather conditions, that there is a 70% chance of rain, the viewers expect him to 
be correct 70% of the time.  Conversely, if he predicts a 10% chance of rain, the 
audience expects not to see rain 90% of the time.  The weather forecaster must 
be both accurate and precise. 
A statistical model, although precise, cannot explain the specific reason a 
Soldier does or does not hit a target.  A good rifleman can miss a target because 
of factors beyond his control, such as a large gust of wind.  An untrained Soldier 
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may make an extremely difficult shot once in a large number of trials.  
Conversely, an extremely precise weapon system can miss if intentionally 
misaimed, while a very inaccurate system may occasionally hit its target by the 
canceling of random errors. 
A model that accurately represents a rifleman’s skill and behavior cannot 
and should not be used as a tool to optimize systems or operator training.  The 
designed experiment does not look at differences in training techniques, 
leadership styles, or methods of instruction to improve rifleman proficiency.  The 
data available is a sample taken under a limited set of conditions.  It does not 
consider factors such as fear, hunger, sleep deprivation, and the effects of 
enemy returning fire at the shooter—all of which can affect a concentrated rifle 
shot.  Furthermore, using the model to find an “optimal” equipment configuration 
to maximize Soldier capabilities would be erroneous.  Marksmanship skills are 
always open to improvement.  Even an “optimal” equipment configuration would 
not adequately represent the maximum capability of any individual in all 
conditions. 
C. BENEFITS 
The model can, however, provide insights into how equipment, coupled 
with tactics and doctrine, may produce successful combat outcomes.  This 
Probability of Hit (PH) model provides a parent simulation with accurate variation 
for individual-on-individual engagements in a larger scenario.  Additionally, the 
model can assist with better depicting close quarters and urban combat 
scenarios.  The room-to-room fight associated with urban combat puts the 
rifleman in a critical role, in which his marksmanship skills are among the few 
precise means of eliminating a threat.  Accurately modeling the individual 
rifleman, which this model enhances, can then produce more accurate urban 
combat simulations. 
The model can also assist in focusing instruction and training of 
marksmanship skills.  The model, with its analysis of multiple factors and the 
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interaction of those factors, can provide insights into strengths and weaknesses 
of current training standards.  Lower probabilities of hit for a specific weapon type 
or aiming device may lead to insights on where additional training or technical 
knowledge should focus.  The model may help identify elements within an 
organization that need additional instruction to correct marksmanship 
weaknesses, for example M4 riflemen and targets beyond 200 meters. 
D. THESIS FLOW 
 The following chapter, Chapter II, describes the experimental design 
variables and how they are recorded and varied.  Chapter III discusses the type 
and structure of the data and provides summary statistics on several of the key 
factors.  Chapter IV covers the modeling structure and the resulting logistic 
regression model.  The final chapter offers tactical insights from the analysis, 
discusses how the models can improve current combat operation modeling, 




II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This chapter 
• Outlines the design parameters and variables used in the study’s data 
collection. 
• Organizes the variables into two categories, Controllable and Non-
Controllable Factors.  Controllable factors are those variables the study 
could manipulate, such as the shooter’s equipment or posture.  Non-
controllable factors are those the observer cannot or chooses not to 
change between trials, such as wind speed and temperature. 
• Describes the on-site and after action procedures conducted to prepare the 
data for analysis. 
 
A. EXERIMENT PURPOSE 
1. Methods of Collection 
A statistical model needs quantifiable data, and the more data, the better.  
There are four general ways to collect realistic data on marksmanship.   
a. Historical Data 
One method is to use historical data from previous or current 
military operations.  The advantage to this approach is that it includes both 
offensive and defensive factors plus all the neutral environmental factors that 
affect both sides.  The disadvantages to historical data are that data are rarely, if 
ever, collected in real time.  The data typically rely on memory and corroborated 
recollection, both of which are subject to error.   
b. Marksmanship Simulators 
A modern technique available for collecting data is to use a 
marksmanship simulator, such as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST), a 
10-meter indoor simulator, in which Soldiers shoot at a video screen using 
realistic weapon mock-ups (PEO Soldier, 2005).  The advantage is that the EST 
provides accurate recording of rifle movement immediately prior to the firing of 
the bullet, such as that caused by a trigger squeeze or breathing technique.  This 
type of feedback is currently unavailable through other means of instrumentation.  
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One disadvantage is that results are calculated through the computer’s 
programming and may be subject to calibration error.  Another disadvantage is 
that the soldier is in an indoor, controlled environment and is not subject to the 
same environmental factors, such as wind and extreme temperatures, that are 
realities in combat. 
c. Surveys and Subject Matter Experts 
Another option is to use survey data from personnel with 
engineering, human factor, and military small arms experience regarding 
equipment, posture and marksmanship.  This method offers the benefit of 
capturing intangible or immeasurable factors gained only through experience.  A 
disadvantage is that this method may also introduce a huge variance in opinions 
and perspectives.  An informal survey was conducted to gather the insights of 
combat veterans, and this information is available in Appendix C.  The quantity 
and type of information provided is useful in determining Soldiers’ perception of 
equipment interactions, but the responses are not sufficient to build the precise 
mathematical analysis needed. 
d. Range Experiments 
A more accurate and expensive method for collecting data is to use 
the results from an automated rifle range.  This technique offers all the realism of 
environmental effects, such as wind, temperature and visibility, while maintaining 
a great deal of control over the shooter-target scenario parameters.  Fortunately, 
this is the method used by the US Army to qualify rifleman.  One advantage is 
that the cost of collecting data is reduced because the Soldier time, equipment 
and ammunition are already part of the unit’s training resource plan.  Another 
advantage is that existing range procedures create the data for analysis.  One 
person can easily gather and process that information for analysis.  With the 
proper data processing, this technique creates a separate record for each bullet 
fired. 
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2. How Much Data are Enough? 
A company-sized unit (approximately 129 Soldiers) can fire 5,000 to 
30,000 rounds of ammunition in a single day of training.  A mechanized brigade, 
such as the one that participated in this experiment, has over 15 companies and 
2500 people.  Each rifleman would qualify by firing at least 40 rounds—more if 
necessary—with an average of 100 rounds fired per person.  The opportunity for 
collecting large amounts of data is readily available, and the remaining issue is 
deciding which factors provide the strongest information for the given problem.  
The following factors were chosen based on the availability of the information 
and its relevance to a potential Probability of Hit model. 
B. CONTROLLABLE FACTORS 
1. Soldier—Test Subjects 
The Soldiers who conducted the experiments were from the 1st Brigade, 
1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) of Fort Riley, Kansas.  The experiment was 
conducted in conjunction with the unit’s scheduled rifle training.  The unit’s 
training objectives were to conduct day Qualification Record Fire as outlined in 
US Army Field Manual 3-22.9.  In addition to observing standard qualification of 
the brigade, one platoon from B Company, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment 
(Mechanized), lead by 2LT Darryl Hill, was resourced to conduct additional 
marksmanship testing.  These 29 Soldiers, after conducting required unit training, 
conducted additional non-standard firing tables as prescribed by the design of 
experiment. 
The soldiers were not screened or selected for any specific type of training 
prior to their execution of the qualification tables.  This study assumes that all 
participants had previously qualified with an M16 or M4 rifle prior to the day of 
testing.  Rifle qualification is a graduation requirement for Basic Training and is 
also a Fort Riley requirement.  The study does not look at the period of time that 
passed since the previous rifle qualification or the prior level of qualification 
(Marksman, Sharpshooter, or Expert). 
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2. Soldier Posture 
The experiment covered four different firing postures.  The two primary 
postures were the Foxhole Supported Position, shown in Figure 3, and the Prone 
Unsupported Position, shown in Figure 4.  The two alternate positions were the 
Kneeling Position, shown in Figure 5, and the Standing Position, shown in  
Figure 6.  All participants fired from the Foxhole and Prone positions as part of 
the unit training, but only the Test Platoon fired from the Kneeling and Standing 
Postures.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 are photographs of the Soldiers while they were 
conducting the firing experiments. 
In the Foxhole Supported Fighting Position, or Foxhole posture, the soldier 
stands inside a concrete structure with the top of the foxhole at mid-chest level.  
The Soldier has sand bags available to support his hands and stabilize the 
weapon.  Soldiers may lean or rest any part of their body on the foxhole to create 
a stable firing position.  If the foxhole is too deep for the firer, steps or blocks are 
available to improve his position, but the result may not be optimal for the 
soldier’s height and equipment.  The study therefore expects a relationship 
between soldier height, equipment, and firing accuracy from the Foxhole posture. 
 
Figure 3.   Foxhole Supported Firing Position 
 
In the Prone Unsupported Firing Position, or Prone, firers lie on their 
stomachs, as seen below.  The Soldier does not have sandbags or other 
stabilization devices and must stabilize the weapon using only his hands and 
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arms.  Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) with Small Arm Protective Inserts (SAPI) 
can add two to four inches to the height of a soldier’s prone position.  This may 
cause a change in accuracy when wearing body armor in the Prone Position. 
 
Figure 4.   Prone Unsupported Firing Position 
 
The Kneeling Position, shown in Figure 5, is an alternate position not used 
during the standard qualification tables but used by the Test Platoon to test 
alternative firing postures.  No requirements or restrictions were given to the test 
subjects while they used this position, other than requiring one foot to remain flat 
on the ground. 
 
Figure 5.   Kneeling Firing Position 
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The Standing Position, shown in Figure 6, is another non-standard firing 
position.  No restrictions were placed on the test subjects while they were using 
this posture, although unlike the figure below, current training guidance 
recommends that the shooter to stand with both feet square to the target, instead 
of off-set, as shown.  The reason for this is that by keeping the feet square, the 
Soldier’s shoulders—and hence the body armor he is wearing—remain forward, 
creating the most protective posture possible.  The Soldiers used the Standing 
Posture in the short-range experiments only.  For this reason, the effects of this 
posture may not be directly comparable to the other three postures.   
 
Figure 6.   Standing Firing Position 
 
3. Soldier Equipment Configuration 
The typical Soldier from the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) 
fires an M16A2 Rifle. Variations in this configuration include the M16A4 Rifle, the 
M4 Carbine, and the M16 or M4 Rifles with attached M203 Grenade Launcher, 
shown in Figures 7 through 9.  About 15% of the subjects, mostly senior leaders, 
use the M68 Close Combat Optic, seen in Figure 10—while the rest of the 
Soldiers use the traditional ironsight.  Standard survivability equipment includes 
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both a ballistic helmet, the Personal Armor System Ground Troops (PASGT) 
Kevlar helmet, seen in Figure 14, and ballistic body armor, the Interceptor Multi-
Threat Body Armor System (IBA) with Small-Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), 
seen in Figure 13.  All ammunition in the study was M855 5.56-mm Ball. 
 
Figure 7.   M16A4 Rifle with Standard Ironsights 
 (From: Colt, Inc.) 
 
 
Figure 8.   M4 Carbine Modular Weapon System with M68 Close Combat Optic  
(From PEO Soldier) 
 
 
Figure 9.   M203 Grenade Launcher 
 (From PEO Soldier) 
 
 
Figure 10.   M68 Close Combat Optic  
(From PEO Soldier) 
 










                      
 
Figure 12.   Sight Picture of M68 CCO (After AIMSS) 
 
 
Figure 13.   Interceptor Body Armor 
(From PEO Soldier) 
 
 
Figure 14.   Personal Armor System for 
Ground Troops (PASGT) Helmet  
(From FAS.org) 
 
Figure 15.   Interceptor Body Armor with 
PASGT Helmet (From RDECOM) 
 
Figure 16.   Advance Combat Helmet 
 (From PEO Soldier)
Note: Red Aimpoint does not change with 
parallax shift of sight picture 
 
  15
C. NON-CONTROLLABLE FACTORS 
1. Range Design 
The short-range observations are from an Army Modified Record Fire 
Range.  This type of standardized range offered a fully automated target scenario 
controlled and evaluated from the range operations center.  Targets were 
situated at 50, 75, 100, 150, 175, 200, 250, and 300 meters.  The range used two 
types of targets.   At the 50, 75, and 100-meter range, the targets were 26” high 
F-type targets, shown in Figure 17, representing the head and shoulders of a 
human.  From 150 to 300 meters, the targets were 40” high E-type “Ivan” 
Targets, shown in Figure 18, representing a standing human. 
 
Figure 17.   F-Type Silhouette 
                 






The short-range observations were conducted on an Automated Combat 
Pistol Range.  These ranges have E-type targets, such as Figure 18, with 
baseline ranges at 10, 13, 16, 17, 23, 27, and 31 meters.  Pistol ranges do not 
have fighting positions (foxholes), but all other firing postures are possible.  On a 
pistol range, a standing rifleman is generally at the same level as the targets, 
with the “head” of the target standing at about 4.5 feet above the ground. 
The study assumes there is no error in the target system.  The Range 
Control personnel were very diligent in maintaining their facilities. While Soldiers 
notoriously accuse the target equipment of “robbing” a legitimate hit (thus 
denying them of a higher qualification), the range computer had internal 
diagnostics to determine such failures.  The target alerted the range operator of 
suspected targets, and those with problems were either repaired or isolated (i.e., 
the lane was no longer used for qualification).  
2. Target Angle 
The qualification range used two different sized targets, and the model 
needed a common scale to measure the relative size of the one target to 
another.  One solution to overcome this is to relate both targets and their ranges 
as a target angle.  A smaller target angle means there is less tolerance for any 
deviation for aiming or ballistic error.  For example, an apple on a fencepost at 
100 meters is more difficult to hit than the side of a barn at 150 meters because 
the target angle—the angle from the bottom to the top of the target―is smaller.  
In a similar manner, a head and shoulder silhouette target at 100 meters may be 





Smaller Target Angle = Less Tolerance For Error = More Difficult Shot for Er or = More Dif icult Shot 
 
Figure 19.   Target Angle 
  
A common unit for a target angle is Mils.  17.8 mils = 1 degree, and this 
angle corresponds to the width or height of 1 meter at 1000 meters distance.  
The targets are roughly the same width, 20” to 21” for E and F type targets, 
respectively.  This makes it possible to create, on a continuous scale, the angle 
created by the target at a given distance.  For example, the target angle for an E-











Equation 1: Mils Calculation Example 
 
In this way, the 40” E-type targets at 150 meters with a 6.77 mils target 
angle is actually easier to hit than the 26” F-type target at 100 meters with a 6.60 
mils target angle.  While this measurement is only an approximation―a precise 
measurement that requires target surface area and not just height—it is an 
accurate estimate of the difficulty of each shot.  Because the target angle uses 
target range as an input variable, the two factors are highly correlated.  Placing 
both factors in a model could confound the effects of other variables. 
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3. Target Exposure Time 
Changing the target exposure time was possible, but the time required 
was disruptive to the unit’s primary training.  The target exposure times were 
therefore as prescribed in US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-22.9 for the Rifle 
Ranges and FM 3.22-14 for the Pistol ranges.  The target exposure time 
generally increases as the target range increases, with additional time allotted for 
multiple (two) target scenarios.  This was to allow for the additional acquisition 
and engagement time for long-range and multiple targets. 
4. Soldier Anthropometrics 
The Soldiers who conducted the testing were not screened for 
anthropometric characteristics.  Soldier height and weight were only collected on 
the Test Platoon Soldiers.  The average Soldier from the Test Platoon was 70.0 
inches and 181 pounds.  
5. Soldier Experience 
The soldiers were not screened for any type of training or level of 
experience.  The average experience in terms of years of service was 4.42 
years.  Although the Soldiers’ combat experience was not surveyed, roughly half 
the Soldiers had recently returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
6. Soldier Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
A majority of the Soldiers were either Infantrymen, Field Artillerymen, or 
Bradley Linebacker Crewmembers.  All members of the Test Platoon were 
Infantrymen.  In addition to the Combat Soldiers of the brigade, there was a wide 
array of Combat Support and Combat Service Support MOSs in the 
headquarters units as well.  The observations were a fair sample of an Army 
maneuver brigade’s distribution of MOSs. 
Because of the high number of MOSs, some with only one or two 
individuals, the MOSs were aggregated into two groups: Combat or Support.  
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The intent was to determine if Combat MOSs, with their focus on offensive 
combat tasks, had a higher Probability of Hit than their Support MOS comrades. 
7. Weather 
The weather during the experiment was generally cold and dry.  The 
average ambient temperature was 41.9° Fahrenheit.  The range facilities did not 
have immediate meteorological data available, so the study uses National 
Weather Service (NWS) data from the nearest weather station, the Manhattan 
Regional Airport, approximately 10 miles east of the range location.  The weather 
information is used to determine two effects: the effect of wind deflection on the 
bullet, and the effect of temperature and wind on soldier stability (i.e. shaking 
from the cold). 
The National Weather Service provided hourly information.  The wind 
measurements, therefore, are not exact for each observation.  The effects of the 
wind are approximated as such: 
( )
.
sine angleof wind-angleof range windspeed target range 





Equation 2: Estimation of Lateral Wind Deflection 
 
In addition to wind deflection, the direct effects of a shooter’s body shaking 
due to weather were not measurable, but must be assumed to exist. The Soldiers 
were generally exposed to the elements for most of the day, and their exposure 
to the meteorological elements was not controlled or recorded.  The use of cold 
weather equipment such as gloves, thermal underwear, and knit caps were not 
recorded.  The study expected to see that wind had a negative effect and 
temperature had a positive effect on Probability of Hit.  In other words, warm and 
calm weather would be better than cold and windy weather. 
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8. Weight of Equipment 
The study recorded the Soldier’s total weight with equipment prior to firing 
each table.  Knowing the total equipment weight provided an estimate of the 
effects of this weight on marksmanship.  The study measured total weight for 
most firers, but received naked weight for only the Test Platoon.  The estimated 
equipment weight for these soldiers was significant.  Soldiers from the Test 
Platoon were carrying an average of 57.2 pounds while firing.  This weight is still 
below combat equipment weight and does not include the 210+ rounds of 
ammunition, two to four grenades, and additional gear a fully combat-loaded 
Soldier carries. 
D. TESTING SEQUENCE 
There were a total of 10 different firing tables in the experiment.  The first 
two tables were the standard Qualification Record Fire, and the remaining eight 
tables were alternate tables for experiment purposes.  All soldiers fired Tables 1 
and 2 wearing IBA in accordance with the brigade’s training policy.  Only the Test 
Platoon Soldiers conducted Tables 3 through 10.  The sequence of posture and 
equipment treatments by firing table is in Table 1.  
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Table 1.   Range Experimental Tables 
Table Engagement Posture Equipment Participants 
1 1-20 Foxhole Supported Standard with IBA All 
2 21-41 Prone Unsupported Standard with IBA All 
3 41-60 Kneeling Standard with CCO (if issued) Test Platoon 
4 61-80 Prone Unsupported Standard, CCO, w/o IBA Test Platoon 
5 101-120 Foxhole Supported Standard Night Equipment Test Platoon 
6 121-140 Prone Unsupported Standard Night Equipment Test Platoon 
7 141-160 Kneeling Standard Night Equipment Test Platoon 
8 161-180 Prone Unsupported Standard Night Equipment w/o IBA Test Platoon 
9 213-242 Standing Standard* Test Platoon 
10 213-242 Standing Standard w/o Body Armor* Test Platoon 
 
Soldiers shot Tables 1 and 2 wearing IBA until they qualified, hitting 23 or 
more targets out of 40.  After qualifying, the Test Platoon shot Tables 3 and 4, 
using the same target scenarios but changing posture and equipment.  Using the 
same target scenario of Tables 1 and 2 allowed the Test Platoon experiments to 
be interspersed with the standard qualification firers.  Table 3 was identical to 
Table 1, except that the Soldiers shot from the Kneeling posture instead of the 
Foxhole.  Table 4 had the same posture as Table 2, but the Soldiers did not wear 
body armor.  In this way, comparing the Foxhole with Kneeling postures and 
body armor with no Body Armor is possible.  Additionally, several, but not all, 
Soldiers changed aiming devices from Ironsight to M68 Close Combat Optics for 
Tables 3 and 4.  This allows for a comparison of both aiming devices  
The Test Platoon fired the standard Night Qualification Record Fire as 
prescribed in FM 3-22.9 for Tables 5 and 6.  This provided a close comparison of 
daytime to nighttime conditions.  The Soldiers then repeated the scenarios as 
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Tables 7 and 8, with the same alterations as daytime.  Table 7 was identical to 
Table 5 except that the Soldier used the Kneeling posture instead of the Foxhole.  
Table 8 matched Table 6, except that the Soldier removed his body armor.  The 
combinations of Tables 1 through 8 thus provide cross comparisons of posture, 
equipment, and visibility conditions.   
Tables 9 and 10 were short-range tables.  They were identical in target 
presentation except that Soldiers wore IBA in Table 9 and did not in Table 10.  
The Soldiers also shot these tables in different sequences.  Half of the group 
shot Table 9 and then Table 10.  The second half shot Table 10 and then Table 
9.  This was to reduce the learning effect of shooting a non-standard table. 
E. DATA COLLECTION 
1. Prior to Shooting 
During normal range operations, a designated person records the name 
and an identification number for each rifleman, along with his or her 
corresponding firing lane.  This allows the ranger personnel and the study to link 
scores with the owners.  The study modified this standard procedure to also 
record the Soldiers’ type of equipment: weapon, helmet, body armor, aiming 
device, infrared aiming device, and night vision goggle (if firing at night). 
The study gathered personal data—Soldier MOS, Time in Service, and 
unit information—from the battalion Personal Action Centers.  The Soldier 
identification number links the results from the range with the personal 
information. 
2. After-Testing Procedures 
Once the firing table was complete, the range manager provided a copy of 
the firing order manifest and a record of the firers in both digital and paper form, 
as seen in Figure 20.  
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The range results became part of a relational database that recorded each 
bullet as a separate record and links these results to the Soldier data collected 
prior to firing.  The final data for each record contains: 
• Binary Engagement Results (Hit or Miss) 
• Soldier’s Personal Information (MOS, Rank, Time in Service) 
• Equipment Used While Firing (Rifle, Aiming Device, Body Armor) 
• Table Specifications (Target Range and Exposure, Soldier Posture) 
• Time and Environmental Conditions 
 
 F. DATA LIMITATIONS 
1. Hit Location or Miss Proximity 
The range computer records a binomial outcome: Did the target sensors 
detect the strike of the round?  It did not provide the location of a successful hit, 
nor did it provide the miss distance.  This limitation restricts the analysis to 
predicting the Probability of Hit instead of the location of hit for each round. 
There is a modern addition to the hit detection sensor called the Location 
of Miss and Hit (LOMAH).  It uses a radar array at the target’s base to measure 
the location of the bullets trajectory as it break the plane of the target.  LOMAH 
gives a radial miss distance rather than a binomial response.  The benefits of this 






Unit: 1ST BDE     Firing Order:  7    RECFIRE.pgm    Wednesday December 3, 2004     
 
               ------------------------------------------------ 
SEQ DIST        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
--- ----       -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  1   50                 1  1     1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1       
  2  200                 1  1     1              1     1       
  3  100                 1  1     1  1     1     1     1       
  4  150                 1  1  1  1  1     1        1  1       
  5  300                 1  1        1     1                   
  6  250                          1  1     1           1       
  7   50                 1  1  1  1  1  1  1     1  1  1       
  8  200                          1  1                         
  9  150                 1  1     1  1  1  1           1       
 10  250                             1  1     1     1  1       
 11  100                          1  1  1     1     1  1       
 12  200                                1              1       
 13  150                 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1        1       
 14  300                                1  1                   
 15  100                    1        1  1  1  1     1  1       
 16  250                             1  1  1                   
 17  200                    1     1  1  1           1  1       
 18  150                 1     1  1  1  1  1        1  1       
 19   50                 1  1  1     1  1  1     1  1  1       
 20  100                 1        1  1  1  1        1  1       
 21  100                 1  1     1     1  1  1     1  1       
 22  250                 1           1                 1       
 23  150                 1  1     1  1  1  1  1  1     1       
 24   50                 1     1  1  1  1  1  1  1     1       
 25  200                 1  1     1  1  1                      
 26  150                 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1       
 27  200                 1  1     1     1        1  1  1       
 28   50                 1  1  1     1  1  1  1  1  1  1       
 29  150                 1  1  1     1  1  1  1  1  1          
 30  100                 1  1  1     1     1     1  1  1       
 31  150                 1  1     1  1  1  1        1          
 32  300                    1  1                 1     1       
 33  100                 1  1     1  1  1  1     1  1          
 34  200                 1  1  1  1  1  1           1  1       
 35  150                 1  1  1  1  1     1     1  1  1       
 36  250                    1        1              1  1       
 37  100                 1  1  1  1  1  1  1     1  1  1       
 38  150                 1  1     1  1  1        1  1  1       
 39  100                 1  1     1  1  1  1           1       
 40  200                 1  1     1  1                 1       
               -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
TOTALS                  29 29 14 27 34 28 26 11 17 23 32       
 
LANE SCORE   QUALIFICATION    ID             NAME 
---- -----   -------------    --             ---- 
 1                                            
 2                                            
 3     
 4   29      MARKSMAN         9538           TOSCO, 1/16  
 5   29      MARKSMAN         7191           JOHNSONS, 1/16  
 6   14      UNQUALIFIED      7090           SRUNT, 4/3  
 7   27      MARKSMAN         8724           KURIDDIN, 4/3  
 8   34      SHARPSHOOTER     7370           VALETTE, 4/3  
 9   28      MARKSMAN         2170           STAMPO, 1/16  
10   26      MARKSMAN         4650           PARERO, 1/16  
11   11      UNQUALIFIED      6375           HENDERSON, 1/16  
12   17      UNQUALIFIED      7547           STAIL, 1/16  
13   23      MARKSMAN         3507           DAVIS, 4/3  
14   32      SHARPSHOOTER     2549           TURNEY, 1/16                                         
 






2. Short Range Postures—Standing Only 
The opportunity to use the Combat Pistol Qualification Course, Range 2 at 
Fort Riley came only after a great deal of hasty coordination and convincing.  The 
Range Control personnel, therefore, granted the request under very stringent 
controls.  No prone position firing was conducted on account of the range 
limitations.  As a result, the data from Range 2 on 12 December 2004 were not 
as robust in terms of posture, equipment, and observations as were the 
experiments on the standard qualification ranges.  
More importantly, all firing for short ranges is from the Standing posture.  
Thus, the estimates of Probability of Hit for short range data may not be directly 
comparable to the long-range data.   
G. SUMMARY 
Each observation collected is a virtual snapshot of the shooter, target and 
environment at the moment of firing.  The data uses many tangible items as 
factors—type of weapon, aiming device, posture, etc.  The type of equipment 
was simple to identify, but the effects of that equipment are more difficult to 
estimate.  Does the equipment cause the effect, or was the Soldier just more 
confident when using it?  The following chapter profiles several of the tangible 
factors.  For each variable, the summary statistics discuss the distribution, 
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III. STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
This chapter 
• Contains a baseline statistical analysis of the data. 
• Presents baseline statistics on the data and significance of the differences. 
• Discusses shortcomings in the current model and presents possibilities for 
follow-on research. 
 
A. DATA STUCTURE 
The collected data represents observational information on each of 29,005 
shots by 466 Soldiers.  The data variables can be grouped into three categories: 
Shooter, Target, and Environmental Variables.  The response variable is the 
binary outcome of hitting or missing the Target.   The list of variables is below in 
Table 2.  The highlighted fields, marked in yellow and with *, are information 
available only on the Test Platoon Soldiers.  This anthropometric information—
height, weight and physical fitness ability—were recorded during a diagnostic 
Army Physical Fitness Test conducted on the last day of firing.  All other 
information was recorded prior to or during the experiment. 
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Table 2.   List of Observation Variables 
SHOOTER VARIABLES Variable Type Example 
SOLDER ID Unique ID given to each test subject K1234 
SOLDIER RANK–PAY GRADE Rank Soldier Specialist, E-4 
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY 
(MOS) Primary occupation of test subject 11B, Infantryman 
EXPERIENCE/YEARS OF SERVICE 
Years of service of test subject, 
measured from his Basic Active 
Service Date (BASD)  
1.234 years 
TOTAL EQUIPMENT LOAD* Weight of test subject while holding all equipment and ammunition 110 kilograms 
SOLDIER HEIGHT* Height of Soldier without footgear or headgear 1.85 meters 
SOLDIER WEIGHT* Naked weight of Soldier 85 kilograms 
SOLDIER PHYSICAL FITNESS ABILITY* Army Physical Fitness Test score - 300 max. 256 points 
SOLDIER POSTURE Shooting posture Kneeling 
SOLDIER UNIT  Platoon / Company / Battalion 3/B/1-16 IN 
SOLDIER UNIT TYPE Type of battalion Field Artillery 
WEAPON TYPE DOD nomenclature of rifle M4 MWS Carbine 
WEAPON SIGHT TYPE DOD nomenclature of weapon sight M68 CCO 
BODY ARMOR TYPE Nomenclature of body armor IBA 
HELMET TYPE  Nomenclature of helmet model PASGT 
NIGHT VISION TYPE  Nomenclature of night vision device A/N-PVS 14 
NIGHT AIMING DEVICE TYPE  Nomenclature of infrared aiming device A/N-PEQ 2A 
TARGET VARIABLES Variable Type Example 
TARGET DISTANCE/RANGE Distance from shooter to target 250 meters 
TARGET ANGLE Angle of target silhouette from shooter 6.76 mils 
TARGET TYPE Type of target silhouette E-type - 1 
TARGET TIME OF EXPOSURE Time of target exposure to shooter 5 seconds 
SINGLE OR MULTIPLE TARGETS Single-1 target or Multiple- 2 targets  Multiple 
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES Variable Type Example 
FACILITY  LOCATION Name of firing range Range 2 
SHOOTER’S LANE NUMBER Firing lane of shooter  Lane 11 
TIME OF OBSERVATION Time of day of observation 1430 CST 
DATE OF OBSERVATION Day of shooting 10 DEC 04 
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE Temperature of air temperature -1° C 
BAROMETRIC PRESSURE Pressure in inches mercury 30.12 inches 
WIND SPEED Average wind speed  5 meters per second 
WIND DIRECTION Compass direction of wind 295° Magnetic 
CLOUD COVER AND LEVEL Fraction of sky covered by clouds 3/8 
 
*Highlighted Fields are for Test Platoon Only 
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B. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
1. Correlation of Numeric Variables and Response Variable 
Table 3 shows variable correlations for the entire population of Soldiers.  
As expected, the target range is highly correlated with mils, time exposure, and 
wind deflection, with ρ equaling -0.859, 0.353, and 0.597, respectively.  As the 
target range increases, the target angle decreases, the time exposure increases 
(by design), and the expected wind deflection increases.  This means that targets 
looks smaller, exposure time increases, and wind effects increase when the 
target is farther away.  Not expected in this table is the correlation between wind 
speed and time of day.  In Fort Riley, as in most places, the morning wind is not 
as strong as the wind in the afternoon.   
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HIT_MISS WEIGHT YEARS_OF_SERVICE MILS TIME_EXP TGT_RANGE TIME WIND_DFLX SPD TEMP
  4104  rows not used due to missing values. 
Correlations
 
Especially interesting is the correlation of HIT_MISS with the other 
variables.  HIT_MISS is the binary response variable.  Among the other 
variables, those associated with target distance—target range, target angle 
(MILS), and wind deflection—have the most influence.  Because target angle and 
wind deflection are both functions of target range, their strong correlation was 
expected.   
The correlation of variables for the Test Platoon in Table 4 shows some 
interesting differences from the general population.  The columns within the 
dashed border are unique to the Test Platoon.  As expected, a strong 
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relationship exists between Soldier Height and Soldier Weight (ρ = 0.584) and 
Soldier equipment and Soldier Equipment Weight Ratio (ρ =0.914).  Taller 
Soldiers tend to weigh more and carry more equipment than shorter Soldiers.  
One correlation is particularly interesting: the relationship between ambient 
temperature (TEMP) and Soldier Equipment Weight.  The correlation (ρ = -0.278) 
suggests that as temperature decreases, Soldiers are wearing more equipment.  
Soldiers, as with most people, wear additional clothing when it is cold.  Another 
difference between the Test Platoon and the whole population is that for the Test 
Platoon, Years of Service has a stronger correlation with HIT_MISS.  The 
correlation between the two groups, ρ = 0.111 for the Test Platoon versus  
ρ = -0.0009 for the entire sample, suggests that experience matters for the 
infantrymen, but it is not an influential factor for the average soldier.  




















































































































































































































HIT_MISS SOL.HT.M WT Equip. Weight EQUIP _RATIO APFT YRS_OF_SRVC MILS TIME_EXP RANGE TIME WIND_DFLX SPD TEMP
  1830 rows not used due to missing values.
Correlations 
 
2. Average Probability of Hit by Target Range 
Are the observed Soldiers representative of the population of Soldiers in 
the Army?  The Army has an expected Probability of Hit for rifle qualification 
tables such as the ones observed.  The Army’s rifle Qualification manual, Field 
Manual 3-22.9, states that trained riflemen should shoot within the range of 
probabilities seen in Table 5 and graphed in Figure 21.  The Low, Average, and 
High Probability of Hits in Table 5 corresponded to the expected proportions of 
hits for a Marksman (23 hits out of 40), Sharpshooter (32 / 40) and Expert (36/40) 
rifle qualifications.  These are intended as guides for unit leaders to gauge their 
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training programs against published Army standards.   These probabilities are 
realistic and are good standards for training proficiency.  They may not be 
realistic for modeling combat situations.  The upper limit of these probabilities 
seems extremely optimistic, especially considering that in Vietnam 2,200 rounds 
of ammunition were required per enemy kill (Blahnik, 2005). 
 
Table 5.   Expected Probability of Hit (From FM 3-22.9, 2004)) 
RANGE (meters) TARGETS LOW PH AVERAGE PH HIGH PH 
50 5 0.80 0.95 0.98 
100 9 0.70 0.90 0.95 
150 10 0.65 0.90 0.95 
200 8 0.45 0.70 0.90 
250 5 0.35 0.60 0.85 
300 3 0.25 0.50 0.80 
TOTAL 40 23 HITS 32 HITS 37 HITS 






































Expected - FM 3-22.9
 
Figure 21.   Doctrinal Expected Probability of Hit  
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In Figure 22, the proportion of actual hits from the range experiments are 
plotted with the doctrinal Probabilities of Hit.   The results from the range are very 
similar to the Low PH from Table 5.  A Chi-Square Test (Appendix D) rejects the 
hypothesis that the observed Probabilities of Hit are equal to the doctrinal PH a 
p-value << 0.01.  Even though the proportions look similar, the large number of 
observations causes any deviance from the expected PH very unlikely, and the 
Chi-Square Test to fail. 
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Figure 22.   Expected versus Actual Probability of Hit 
 
The test becomes more interesting when the dataset is separated into 
those iterations resulting in a qualification and those that do not.  As Figure 23 
shows, the actual proportion of hits now lies between the doctrinal Low and 
Average PH.  The Chi-Square again rejects the hypothesis that the qualified runs 
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are like any of the doctrinal Probability of Hits.  This means that the qualified runs 
are better than the Low PH, but not quite as high as the Average PH. 
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PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
Actual versus Expected--Qualified and Unqualifying Iterations
 
Figure 23.   Expected versus Actual Probability of Hit 
 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 break the range observations into two groups, 
Short Range and Standard Range.  This is due to the dramatic difference in 
Probability of Hit for Standing posture, which is conducted on the Short Range 
only.  Figure 25 also shows the results of the Test Platoon against the Sample 
Population.  The Chi-Square Test fails to reject the hypothesis that the Test 
Platoon is similar to the Sample Population with p-value = 0.2091.  The same test 
rejects the hypothesis that either population is similar to any of the doctrinal 
Probabilities of Hit.  This means that the data from the Test Platoon reasonably 
reflects the Sample Population.  The Test Platoon, even though they are all 
Infantry rifleman, represents a good sample of observations from the entire 
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brigade.  A model created with the platoon’s data can reasonably predict the 
Probability of Hit for not only the platoon but also the brigade.  Since the platoon 
was statistically similar to the expected doctrinal performance, the model from 
the platoon’s data may reasonably predict the performance of the average US 
Army rifleman. 
 




























Figure 24.   Probability of Hit—Short Range  
The Probability of Hit for both types of firing—standard and short range—
decreases with target distance.  The decrease, however, is much more rapid for 
the short range.  The reason is that the short range data represent only the 
Standing posture, which is also the least stable posture, whereas the standard 
ranges are a composite of Prone, Foxhole, and Kneeling postures.  This is 
discussed further in a subsequent paragraph.  Also interesting is the increase in 
PH from 100 to 150 meters.  As discussed in the topic of target angle, this is the 
effect of the E-type target at 150 meters having a larger target angle—a larger 
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relative size to the firer.  This made the target “bigger” and easier to hit than the 
smaller F-type silhouette at 100 meters.   
 
































PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
TEST PLATOON VS. WHOLE SAMPLE
 
Figure 25.   Test Platoon versus Sample Population—Standard Range 
 
3. Probability of Hit by Body Armor 
The initial hypothesis was that IBA body armor restricts natural movement 
and hence reduces the Probability of Hit for the Soldiers wearing it.  As seen in 
Figure 26, for target ranges from 50 to 150 meters, those Soldiers wearing IBA 
actually shot better than those without IBA.  This advantage, however, 
diminished as distance increased.  At 200 meters, riflemen not wearing IBA shot 
better than those who were wearing it.  The Chi-Square test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the two types of body armor were equal with a p-value << 0.01. 
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PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
By Body Armor - Day Prone Tables Only
 
Figure 26.   Probability of Hit by Body Armor Type 
 
A mitigating factor may explain the better performance with the IBA.  The 
Soldiers conducted pre-marksmanship instruction (PMI) and zeroed their 
weapons while wearing body armor.  Therefore, they were trained and 
accustomed to shooting in IBA.  This created a possible bias toward the IBA, and 
thus, shooting without body armor could introduce an additional error because 
the Soldier was unaccustomed with this equipment configuration.  The current 
data cannot prove this theory because no data were collected on the methods or 
equipment used prior to the experiment. 
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Table 6.   Distribution of Observations by Body Armor Type 
Level Count Percentage 
FLAKVEST 380 1.31% 
IBA 27333 94.23% 
NONE 1292 4.45% 
 
That the non-IBA wearing Soldiers shot slightly better at longer ranges is a 
critical fact.  As discussed in the Chapter I, the Squad Designated Marksman’s 
primary engagement criteria are targets between 300 and 500 meters.  The data 
suggest that the SDM might be more lethal without full body armor.  Not wearing 
IBA might improve the SDM’s marksmanship, but it also reduces his survivability 
against enemy fire.  Ranges beyond 300 meters are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, so it remains unknown how IBA affects targets between 300 and 500 
meters.  The trade-offs between survivability and lethality are also not part of this 
study, but these issues have an impact on SDM tactics and may be worth further 
study.  This is discussed further in Chapter V. 
4. Probability of Hit by Firing Posture 
 The study also analyzes the effects of posture on marksmanship.    As 
seen above in Table 7, almost 95% of the observations come from the standard 
qualification postures, Prone Unsupported and Foxhole Supported.  The Test 
Platoon constitutes about 10% of all observations, with a roughly uniform 
distribution of observations on all four postures.  Almost all Kneeling and all 
Standing observations are from the Test Platoon.  
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Table 7.   Distribution of Observations by Posture 
Level  Count Percentage
PRONE UNSUPPORTED FIGHTING POSITION 14135 48.73% 
FOXHOLE SUPPORTED FIGHTING POSITION 13362 46.06% 
STANDING 780 2.68% 
KNEELING 728 2.51% 
 
As seen in Figure 27, there is a marked difference in the Probabilities of 
Hit between postures.  The more stable postures, such as Foxhole Supported, 
are inherently more accurate than an unstable position, such as Standing or 
Kneeling.  The chart shows the same decrease in PH as the target distance 
increases.  Interestingly, Kneeling, although less accurate than the other 
postures, does not demonstrate the precipitous drop in PH that the Standing 
posture does.  On average, the Kneeling posture is about 12% less accurate 
than the other two firing postures, but these disadvantages diminish as target 
range increases to 300 meters. 
Also interesting is that the PH for Kneeling at 150 meters (0.49) is not 
greater than that at 100 meters (0.51), as with the traditional postures.  This may 
lend some insight as to the reason for a lower Probability of Hit.  Errors caused 
by hasty trigger squeeze normally cause horizontal deviance, whereas errors 
caused by improper breathing causes vertical deviance.  If the additional vertical 
target angle from F-type target at 100 meters to E-type has no effect, this could 
mean that a majority of the shooter-induced error results from trigger squeeze.  If 





















































Figure 27.   Probability of Hit by Posture 
 
A multi-comparison of the postures—excluding Standing—shows that 
Kneeling is indeed not equal to the Prone or Foxhole firing positions.  At the α  = 
0.05 and α  = 0.10 levels, the Chi-Square Test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
postures are equal. 
5. Probability of Hit by Weapon Type 
As seen in Table 8, the average experience for the M203 rifle in years of 
service is roughly equal to that of the M16 rifleman.  The M4 riflemen have 
significantly more service than their counterparts, on average 2.5 years 
experience.  The senior leaders in a platoon and company normally carry the M4 








Table 8.   Distribution of Observations by Weapon Type 
Level  Count Percentage Average Years of Service
M16A2/4 Rifle 21794 75.14% 3.97 
M203 Grenade Launcher 1902 6.56% 4.09 
M4 MWS Carbine 5309 18.30% 6.47 
 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 break down the proportion of hits by weapon 
type.  For both short range (less than 50 meters) and standard ranges (50 to 300 
meters), the probability of hit is generally the same for any weapon used.  The 
M4, because of its shorter barrel, will be inherently less accurate than a longer 
barreled M16 variant.  (FM 3-22.9) 








































Figure 28.   Probability of Hit by Weapon Type—Short Range 
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Figure 29.   Probability of Hit by Weapon Type—Standard Range 
 
The differences in Probability of Hit for weapon types are significant.  The 
Chi-Square Test (Appendix D) fails rejects the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in Probability of Hit based on weapon type with p-value << 0.01.  The 
multi-comparison test shows that there is significant difference between the rifles 
with the M203 GL and the other rifle types, but there is no significant difference 
between the M4 and M16 rifles.  This Chi-Square Test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the Probabilities of Hit for the two rifles are equal with p-value = 
0.6549. 
The differences in Probability of Hit that resulted from the various rifle 
types defy a simple explanation.  As noted above, the M4’s shorter barrel is less 
accurate, yet other reasons may exist for the different findings.  It is possible that 
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Soldier experience has a negative effect on the Probability of Hit.  If the M4 
rifleman are more experienced, and this experience negatively affects their 
accuracy, then the average Probability of hit will be lower for the M4 riflemen 
than for the M16 riflemen. 
6. Probability of Hit by Aiming Device 
How does the aiming device affect Probability of Hit?  The majority of 
shooters, over 95%, used the standard ironsight.  The M68 Close Combat Optic 
(CCO) is equipment currently available to the combat units.  Even when 
available, the equipment is not uniformly used throughout the force, as was the 
case for the brigade’s basic qualification.  The Soldiers initially qualified with their 
ironsights, and then, if time and equipment were available, they requalified with 
the CCO.  As a result, most soldiers either did not have a CCO issued or did not 
have time to requalify. 
This was not an issue for the Test Platoon.  They conducted a basic 
ironsight qualification on one day and then returned to conduct subsequent 
firings with the CCO.   Even among the Test Platoon, there were not enough 
CCOs for all soldiers to dual qualify.  Figure 30 shows that the limited number of 
observations in which the one soldier fires both systems prevents any definitive 
conclusion on the effects of the CCO.  The Chi-Square Test fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the iron sight is equal to the M68 CCO.  The data suggests that 
the M68CCO performs no better or worse than the Ironsight. 
 
Table 9.   Distribution of Observations by Aiming Device 
Level  Count Percentage 
IRONSIGHT 27741 95.64% 
M68CCO 820 2.82% 
OTHER 444 1.53% 
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Figure 30.   Probability of Hit by Aiming Device—Standard Range 
 
We now look at the same scenario applied for the nighttime aiming 
devices.  As discussed earlier, little collection took place after dark.  The Test 
Platoon did conduct a small set of night engagements, using night vision goggles 
and infrared aiming lasers.  The seven firers that conducted this testing used 
their organic weapons systems with no additional lighting on the range.  Those 
Soldiers with A/N-PEQ 2A lasers with infrared illuminators did not use those 
capabilities during the table.  Ambient light conditions were not good, and this is 
a dominant reason the Probabilities of Hit are quite low.  The observations should 
be considered a poor representation of night-time capabilities.   
7. Probability of Hit by Helmet 
Does the Soldier’s type of helmet have any effect on his Probability of Hit?  
Figure 31 shows a strong difference in the Probability of Hit due to the effects of 
helmets.  As Table 10 shows, however, the number of observations with 
Advance Combat Helmet (ACH) are few when compared to the legacy system, 
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the Personal Armor System Ground Troop–Helmet (PASGT).  This uneven 
number of contrasting observations does not support strong statistical analysis.  
Other unique factors might explain the difference in PH better than helmet type.  
The only test subjects with the new helmet are all from the same unit, 2nd 
Battalion, 54th Armor, that was preparing for combat deployment.  The effects of 
the ACH are confounded with the effects of the unit type and MOS.  Regardless, 
the Chi-Square Test rejects the null hypothesis that the two helmets were equal 
with a p-value << 0.01. 
 
Table 10.   Distribution of Observations by Helmet Type 
Level  Count Percentage 
Advance Combat Helmet 200 0.690 
PASGT Kevlar Helmet 28805 99.310 
 



































Figure 31.   Probability of Hit by Helmet Type 
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8. Probability of Hit by Soldier’s Rank 
Is there a difference in Probability of Hit by Soldier rank or experience?  
The test subjects came from an active maneuver brigade, with Soldiers of all 
levels of rank and experience.  The lowest rank observed was an E-1 Private and 
the most senior rank was an E-9 Command Sergeant Major (for enlisted) and O-
3 Captain (for officers).  Officers of the rank O-4 Major and higher were not 
observed, as most of these personnel were issued a pistol and would not 
normally fire a rifle. 
Table 11 shows that over 94% of the data is from enlisted 
servicemembers, either Soldiers serving their initial enlistment or 
Noncommissioned Officers (NCO).  This distribution is typical of an Infantry 
Company, where a 129-man company has 5 officers, 31 NCOs, and 93 enlisted 
Soldiers.  Figure 32 shows the results of separation by rank group.  The Chi-
Square Test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the shooting of enlisted Soldiers and officers with a p-value of 0.791.  It also fails 
to reject the hypothesis that the rank groups (Soldier, NCO and Officer) shoot 
equally well at the α  = 0.10 level.  The results demonstrate no significant 
difference between rank groups. 
 
Table 11.   Distribution of Observations by Rank Group Type 
Level  Count Percentage 
SOLDIER 20518 71.03% 
NCO 6650 23.02% 
COMPANY OFFICER 1717 05.94% 
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Table 12.   Distribution of Observations by Enlistment Type 
Level  Name Rank Group Count Percentage
SPC Specialist Soldier 14504 50.00%
PFC Private First Class Soldier 4994 17.21%
SGT Sergeant NCO 3939 13.58%
SSG Staff Sergeant NCO 1440 4.96%
SFC Sergeant First Class NCO 1031 3.55%
PV2 Private Soldier 940 3.24%
2LT 2nd Lieutenant Officer 760 2.62%
1LT 1st Lieutenant Officer 637 2.19%
CPT Captain Officer 320 1.10%
CPL Corporal Soldier 120 0.41%
UNK Unknown 120 0.41%
CSM Command Sergeant Major NCO 80 0.27%
PVT Private Soldier 80 0.27%
1SG First Sergeant NCO 40 0.13%
 
 







































Figure 32.   Probability of Hit by Rank Group 
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9. Probability of Hit by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
Do some Military Occupational Specialties shoot differently than others?  
We would expect Infantrymen to shoot better than those Soldiers in a supporting 
or service specialties, such as cooks or medics.  The study observed a total of 42 
different MOSs, a fair sample from the distribution of MOSs in a typical maneuver 
combat brigade.  The MOSs are aggregated into two categories: Combat and 
Combat Support.  The Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and Armor 
MOSs are aggregated into the category Combat and all other MOSs into the 
category Support.  The combat MOSs comprise 80.7% of the total observations 
and all of the short range observations.  Almost half of the total observations are 
infantry, with 36.5%.  All of the Test Platoon are MOS 11B—Infantry. 
 
Table 13.   Distribution of Observations by MOS 





Table 14.   Distribution of Observations by MOS Functional Area 
Level Count Percentage 
OTHER 920 3.17% 
INFANTRY 10584 36.49% 
FIELD ARTILLERY 9053 31.21% 
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY 2460 8.48% 
ARMOR 1548 5.34% 
 
As seen in Figure 33, MOS does not appear to significantly affect the 
Probability of Hit. The probability of hit for each category is nearly identical, so 
close that the MOS type does not seem to be a first-order effect.  The Chi-
Square Test p-value is 0.8519 and retains the hypothesis that the two MOS 
categories are the same at standard significant levels.  This is an interesting 
finding in itself—the Support Elements shoot as well as their Combat MOS 
comrades.   
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Figure 33.   Probability of Hit by MOS Group 
 
When the data are separated into Infantry and Non-Infantry observations, 
as seen in Figure 34, there is a significant difference between the two groups, 
with a Chi-Square Test p-value = 0.0635.  Infantry Soldiers do not shoot better 
than non-Infantry Soldiers.  The Test Platoon also does not shoot significantly 
better than the sample population.  The Chi-Square Test fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the two samples are different with a p-value of 0.2096.  
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Figure 34.   Probability of Hit by Infantry and Non-infantry 
 
When the data are separated by the Soldier’s battalion type—Infantry, 
Armor, Field Artillery or Cavalry—differences begin to appear.  As seen in  
Figure 35, the infantry battalion has a higher Probability of Hits than other 
battalions.  The Chi-Square Test rejects the null hypothesis that all the battalions 
shoot the same with a p-value << 0.01.  The Infantry Soldier’s shot slightly better 
than their non-Infantry brethren.  The differences are between Infantry and the 
Armor and Field Artillery are significant, however, and the Chi-square Test 
rejects the hypothesis that the two populations are equal with a p-value << 0.01.  
The same is not true for the Infantry and the Cavalry Battalions.  The Chi-Square 
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Figure 35.   Probability of Hit by Battalion Type 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The statistics in this chapter are simple two-dimensional profiles of the 
data.  Although it is easy to state that one piece of equipment is significantly 
more accurate than another piece of equipment, the complete effects of 
equipment and posture are more complex than these charts and statistics can 
reveal.  The correlation matrices show where some variables contain much of the 
same information and where they may impact the Probability of Hit.  This is still 
not a complete picture of how all variables interact.  To gain this complete 
picture, one can create a complex logistic regression model of the data.   
Regression models may explain much of what we observe, but they 
cannot explain everything.  Some Soldiers are naturally talented riflemen, and no 
measurable data can explain the reasons.  Two Soldiers with exactly the same 
equipment, training, and target scenario will not shoot exactly the same.  Striving 
to explain these reasons can create a model that explicates the data too fully.  A 
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statistical model that over-fits the original data has excellent prediction power for 
the one sample, but it may have poor capabilities on independent samples.  
There is a balance between predicting too much and not enough. 
Chapter IV discusses the approach to creating the logistic regression 
models.  It also evaluates the competing models and chooses a model that is 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
All models are wrong, but some are useful. 
—George Box  
This chapter 
• Describes the methods and techniques used to create the probability of hit 
model.   
• Tests several models for goodness of fit using the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
Test. 
 
A. SELECTING APPROPRIATE DATA 
1. Non-Qualifying Observations 
The majority of the data are observations from the Qualification Record 
Fire tables.  To qualify with the rifle, Soldiers must hit 23 or more of the 40 
targets in Tables 1 and 2.  If the Soldier did not meet this minimum standard, the 
score was discarded and the Soldier tried again.  Nearly one-third of the 29,005 
observations are from non-qualifying iterations.  In the data set, they represent 
observations with learning effects―observations that will tend to improve from 
observation to observation. 
 Should the unqualified data be part of the modeling data?  Using the non-
qualifying data would introduce bias into the model that would under-represent 
the skills of the qualified riflemen.  If the Army does not employ these unqualified 
Soldiers in combat, why use unqualified Soldier data to model Soldiers in 
combat?  Figure 36 shows the difference in the Probabilities of Hit for qualifying 
and non-qualifying iterations.  The Chi-Square Test rejects the hypothesis that 
the two subsets are equal with a p-value << 0.01.  The model therefore does not 
include information from the non-qualifying iterations. 
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Figure 36.   Probability of Hit by Qualifying Iteration 
 
By rejecting the unqualified data, we introduce two assumptions into our 
model.  First, the resulting model would only be used to model qualified rifleman.  
The model would not apply to Soldiers in training.  Second, the model assumes 
that the qualifying iteration is not a fluke.  This means that the Probability of Hit 
does not change over time, due to skill deterioration or fatigue. 
2. Day and Night Effects 
Fewer observations were taken during night conditions.  The Soldiers 
made sincere efforts during those runs, but the results did not meet current 
qualifying standards (FM 3-22.9, 2004).  Excluding these observations makes the 
remaining data easier to model but also reduces the model’s usefulness.  The 
goal is to model the rifleman during both day and night, but the current data 
  55
inadequately represents rifleman nighttime capabilities.  This, however, does not 
invalidate the night time data.  Having some predictive capabilities for nighttime is 
better than having none at all.  The night time data are therefore included in the 
modeling set.  The effects of darkness appear as the effects of the nighttime 
aiming device, since ambient light measurements are not part of the dataset 
3. Test Platoon Sample versus Entire Sample 
How much data are sufficient for the modeling?  What are the risks in 
modeling with only part of the data?  The Test Platoon contributes 3,470 
observations, 2,930 from qualifying or alternate.  The Test Platoon also 
contributes most of the Kneeling observations and all of the Standing, Short 
Range, and Night observations.  Any analysis of Posture or Body Armor must 
use the Test Platoon data.  On the other hand, the Test Platoon is only 10% of 
the data, and ignoring the other 90% of the available information may increase 
the model’s error. The Test Platoon has more levels of the posture and 
equipment, but no variation in MOS or unit variables.  In contrast, the entire 
sample has more levels of the MOS and Battalion type, but these factors are not 
the focus of the study.  Furthermore, the initial analysis shows that these factors 
are insignificant or marginally significant.  The entire sample set is large enough 
to conduct a bootstrap method―building a model from random subsets of the 
total data―very well, but fitting a model to all 29,005 observations is not feasible 
with the computers available. 
The computing capabilities became the limiting factor.  The study had 
access to desktop and laptop computers.  Creating multiple regression models 
with possibly hundreds of variables on 29,000 observations was beyond the 
machine’s memory capabilities.  The Test Platoon became the data set for the 
model. 
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B. LOGISTIC MODELING 
1. Stepwise Logistical Regression 
How many factors should the model contain?  A very simple model is one 
that uses only target distance to determine Probability of Hit.  Table 5  from 
Chapter III is one such model.  This model is easy to implement, but it is not 
sensitive to other variables, such as posture or equipment.  A more complex 
model, one with many factors, such as posture, wind speed, body armor, or 
aiming device, offers more flexibility in scenario parameters, but such a model is 
more difficult to implement inside a simulation. 
This study produced several models, but will discuss only three.  The 
simplest, Model #1, uses only target range and shooter posture.  It has five 
degrees of freedom, but it accounts for only 1% of the variability in the Test 
Platoon data.  A slightly more complex model, Model #2, introduces target 
exposure time and target angle as predictor variables.  This second model has 
10 variables and accounts for 7% of the observed variance.  It does not appear 
that models with simple predictive factors are going to have sufficient predictive 
power.  The models need to be more complex. 
The issue of model complexity was solved with Mixed Stepwise 
Regression (Sall, Creighton, and Lethman, 2005) and implemented in JMP IN 
Release 5.1.2.  The level of significance for each factor to enter or leave the 
model was p = 0.10. 
The model began with the following factors: 
Shooter Variables: Height2, Equipment Weight2, Equipment Weight 
Ratio2, Years of Service2, Weapon Type, Body Armor 
Type, Aiming Device, Posture 
Target Variables: Range2, Target Angle2, Single-Multiple 
Environmental Variables: Temperature2, Wind Speed2, Wind Deflection2 
Plus: Interaction between all first order variables. 
The superscripted variables correspond to both first and second-order 
effects (e.g. Height2 → Height + Height*Height).  The model introduced first and 
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second-order variables of all continuous variables plus the interactions between 
all first-order terms.  For example, Height + Height*Height + Height*Weapon + 
Height*Body Armor + Height*Equipment Weight + etc.  There were a total of 114 
possible coefficients for the stepwise regression to include.  Of these, only 38 
were significant in the presence of the others at the p = 0.10 level.  The 38 
degrees of freedom accounts for 28% (R2 = 0.2825) of the variability in the 2,240 
observations.  The negative log likelihood is 427, with a p-value < 0.01.  This 
rejects the hypothesis that the model provides no predictive improvement.  
Appendix A lists the model factors and their significance.  Interpreting the 
coefficients from this report is complex, as JMP automatically creates dummy 
categorical variables that may be either {0,1} or {-1,0,1} that reverse the effects of 
the listed coefficients.  The significance of the variables is much easier to 
interpret.  The majority of the variables have a large significance.  The right 
column of Appendix A shows the p-value associated with the hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero, iβ  = 0.  All of the 2nd order terms and interaction 
terms have      p-values < 0.05.  As stated above, this model uses p = 0.10 to 
enter and to leave the model.  It is interesting that the significances are either 
greater than 0.10, and they are not included in the model, or less than 0.05.  
There are no factors with p-values between 0.05 and 0.10.  This point lends 
further credibility in the resulting model.  All factors includes in the final model are 
more significant than the minimum standard requires. 
 One note about the R2 = 0.28.  This number is deceivingly low.  It 
means that with all 38 variables, regression modeling explains only 28% of the 
variance in the data.  R2 values tend to be low for binary data.  The meaning of 
R2 in this case is that equipment, posture and all other factors make a difference, 
but not as much as the “intangible” variables discussed earlier: training, 
concentration, confidence, and leadership.  These intangible factors comprise the 
other 72% of the variation, but they are the most difficult to measure.  The low R2 
might not be good for this study, but it adds background to the higher purpose of 
understanding rifle marksmanship and Soldier performance.  Improving rifleman 
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capabilities has less to do with the tangible pieces of equipment and more to do 
with training and leadership. 
2. Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) Test 
After the regression was complete, the next step is testing the model for 
goodness of fit.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is an established method to 
determine goodness of fit for a logistic regression model with a large number of 
factors (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).  The test determines if the model’s 
predicted responses are statistically close to the proportion of actual responses.  
Using the weather forecaster analogy again, the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
determines if it rains about 80% the time the forecaster says “80%.”  The test 
sorts in ascending order the observations according to the model’s prediction of 
success, pˆ .  It bins the observations into g groups, normally 10, and calculates 
the average pˆ  for each group,π .  The test then compares the observed number 














−= −∑  
Equation 3: The Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic (After Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2000) 
where Oi is the number of successes the ith group, Ni is the number of 
observations in the ith group, and iπ  is the average estimated probability of 
success in the ith group. The sum of the squared differences of each group 
divided by the variance is the C-statistic.  A lower C-statistic corresponded to a 
better fitting model.  A C-statistic of 0.00 means the model accurately predicted 
all observations. 
Hosmer and Lemeshow prove that asymptotically the C-statistic follows 
the Chi-Square distribution (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1980) and accurately tests 
the hypothesis that the predicted Probability of Hit is statistically close to the 
observed proportion of hits.  The final product of the test is an assessment on the 
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Goodness of Fit.  A p-value < α , such as p-value < 0.10, corresponds with a 
model that poorly fits the observed data.  The Chi-Square probability α  < p-value 
< 1.00 corresponded to a model that closely fits the data it predicts. 
C. TESTING THE MODELS 
Figure 37 displays the result of the HL Test on the three models.  All 
models use the same data.  The table lists model identification number, the input 
parameters by category, the degrees of freedom/input variables used in the 
model, the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test C-statistic, and the model’s goodness of fit 
measure. 
Model #1, the model with only target range and shooter posture, does not 
sufficiently fit the data according to the HL test.  Model #2 does better, with a  
p-value of 8.5%.  This means that if the model is correct, there is only an 8.5% 
chance of seeing data as discordant as the observed data.  The full outline of 
Model #2 is in Appendix A.  Model #3, with nearly all recorded continuous and 
categorical variables, does the best in the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test.  There was a 
19.7% chance that if the model is correct, we would see data such as extreme as 
the observational data.  The full list of model coefficient estimates and factors is 
in Appendix B.  Model #3 is henceforth used to describe effects of the equipment 
and posture. 
One note about statistical versus practical significance: Model #3 best 
predicts the observed data with all available factors.  This does not mean #3 is 
the best model for all uses.  It may predict Probability of Hit adequately well for 
one use, but may require too much time to collect and maintain for another 
simulation.  Model #1 and #2 may be statistically insignificant, but may be 
practically significant for other uses.  The user is the only one who can truly 
determine if a test has practical significance. 
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Table 15.   Model Description and Significance 
Model Input Parameters df C-  Statistic p-value 
1 Shooter:  Posture 
Target:  Range 
5 31.56 0.000 
2 Shooter:  Posture 
Target:  Range, Target Angle & Exposure Time 
10 13.88 0.085 
3 Shooter:  Posture, Height, Equip Weight & Ratio, 
Years of Experience, Weapon, Aim 
Device, Rank Group 
Target:  Range, Target Angle, Exposure Time, 
Single or Multiple 
Environment: Wind Speed, Temperature 

























Figure 37.   Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Results 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF FACTORS 
Another utility of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is that it determines 
goodness of fit for different treatments of individual factors.  In this way, it is 
possible to test whether a model predicts well for specific factors, such as IBA, 
the M4 Carbine, or the Kneeling Posture.  The following charts plot the average 
Probability of Hit versus the actual proportion of hits for the different levels of 
Body Armor and Posture.  The tables following the charts list the Hosmer-
Lemeshow Test goodness of fit p-value for the model at each level. 
1. Body Armor 
Figure 38 shows the plotted difference in the levels of body armor.  As 
discussed in Chapter III, these differences are statistically significant, with the 
Chi-Square test rejecting the null hypothesis that the two types of body armor are 
equal.  The dashed lines in Figure 38 represent the model’s predicted Probability 
of Hit.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow Test rejects the hypothesis that the model is a 
good fit for IBA at the α  = 0.10 level with a p-value of 0.048.  It fails to reject the 
hypothesis for non-IBA shooters with a p-value of 0.297.  
These probabilities are remarkable because Body Armor is not an input 
factor in the prediction model.  Both the actual and predicted data show 
significant differences between shooting with and without body armor.  In the 
model, however, knowing body armor is not important if other variables are 
known.  Body armor is not significant in the presence of other known variables.  
This offers a good explanation why the model scored well in the HL test for all 
data but does not score well for the subset of observations with IBA―the model 
did not use IBA as a predictor variable. 
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PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
ACTUAL vs PREDICTED- DAY & NIGHT TABLES
 
Figure 38.   Actual versus Fitted for Body Armor Type 
 
The effects of Body Armor are conclusive.  The Chi-Square Test rejects 
the hypothesis that IBA and No IBA are equal with probability p = 0.006.   
Figure 39 shows how those Probabilities of Hit change when the night 
observations are removed.  The differences are still there, but outside of 200 
meters, the results are not as definitive.  The non-IBA firers shoot better than the 
IBA firers at 200 and 300 meters.  The predicted Probabilities of Hit for Model #3 
are also graphed in dashed lines to show the smoothing required.  The model 
does not show the interaction of the observed data. 
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PROBABILITY OF HIT BY RANGE
ACTUAL vs PREDICTED- DAY TABLES ONLY
 
Figure 39.   Actual versus Fitted for Body Armor Type—Day Tables Only 
 
 




No Body Armor 
Pass All at  
α  = 0.10 




The model uses posture to determine Probability of Hit.  As seen in  
Figure 40, the model generally fits each posture.  The Foxhole posture has the 
worst fit, and the HL test p-value of 0.105 confirms this.  What is reassuring is 
that the model finds significant effects for each of the postures and uses those 
postures to measure interactions. 
The interactions between posture and other variables are complex.  
Prone, Foxhole and Standing postures with Years of Service had a positive effect 
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on Probability of Hit.  As experience increases in these postures, Probability of 
Hit also increases.  Soldiers with more experience shoot better from the Prone, 
Foxhole and Standing positions.  The opposite happens with Kneeling.  While 
Kneeling, the Soldiers with less experience shoot better than Soldiers with 
experience.   
More interestingly, in the Prone, Standing, and Foxholes postures, 
Probability of Hit decreases as height increases.  PH decreases on the order of 
one percent for every inch of height.  This means that even with the issues of 
foxhole depth being a problem for short Soldiers, tall Soldiers do not have an 
advantage.  The opposite was true for the Kneeling posture, where every 
additional inch of height is an advantage.  The advantages are much more 
pronounced, where every inch above 70 inches gives a 16 percent advantage. 
The model contains significant interactions between posture and both 
weapon type and total equipment weight.  Most significant is the interaction 
between posture and total equipment weight.  The interaction is between 
standing and equipment weight.  As equipment weight increases, Probability of 
Hit decreases.  This is intuitive—the weight of the equipment adds instability to 
the rifleman’s arms.  This should be most pronounced in the least stable posture, 
Standing. 
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Pass All at 
α  = 0.10 
0.857 0.105 0.357 0.436 Yes 
Table 1:  Model Fit to Firing Posture 
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E. SUMMARY 
The model produced with the observational data is statistically significant.  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow proves the model’s validity at the α  = 0.10 level for one 
level of body armor and four levels of postures.  These findings, however, are not 
important. 
The important findings are the insights this model provides into how 
equipment and posture interact to influence rifleman lethality.  These insights 
lead to better understanding of the rifleman’s strengths and weaknesses.  
Understanding his strengths and weaknesses should lead to improvements in 
equipment and tactics.  Those improvements save lives.  This is truly important. 
The next chapter discusses the ramifications of the insights revealed 
during the study.  It outlines areas of improvement for both equipment and 
training of riflemen.  It concludes with a discussion of the study’s lessons learned 
and opportunities for follow-on research. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Scientists can predict with some precision how technological 
improvements in weaponry will pay off on the battlefield.  In both 
the Gulf War and the Iraqi War, the Iraqis possessed modern 
weapons.  They simply did not know how to employ them.  
Technology will do little for the badly trained.  In the end, 
technology is a tool.  Only training can enable the soldier or marine 
to use the tools of war effectively. 
    (Murray and Scales, 2003) 
This final chapter 
• Discusses tactical insight of the analysis. 
• Introduces areas of follow-on work available. 
• Provides a design of experiment to strengthen the existing body of data and 
subsequent model. 
 
A. TACTICAL INSIGHTS 
1. Effects of Body Armor 
a. Squad Designated Marksman 
The model does not show a significant interaction between target 
range and IBA.  The trend in the data, however, does show a trend between 
body armor and target distance, and the implications of such an interaction could 
be significant on the Squad Designated Marksman (SDM). The Squad 
Designated Marksman is to maneuver with his rifle squad and engage targets 
from 300 to 500 meters.  If there is a negative effect from body armor, this 
equipment could possibly make him a less effective marksman at these longer 
ranges.  One option to overcome this would be to employ SDM with body armor 
and be less effective.  A better option may be to modify the IBA, and develop a 
SDM training regiment to reduce the negative effects of body armor. 
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The first option is already occurring.  Responders to the survey in 
Appendix C write of “never [shedding] their body armor in a combat situation.” 
(Response 3.12)  The Soldiers trust the equipment and understand that it stops 
bullets.  At this point in the Global War on Terror, it would be very difficult to 
convince a Soldier not to wear body armor.  If given a choice, SDMs will most 
likely choose the survivability of IBA over perceived benefits in Probability of Hit.  
On the other hand, the responders wrote of specific individuals, namely snipers, 
removing their body armor for an operation.  Snipers, however, unlike SDMs, do 
not maneuver with rifle squads, and if they remove body armor, it is likely for the 
improved stealth and comfort while in a hide position and not for the added 
lethality. 
The second option, redesigning the Interceptor Body Armor, is an 
option that could improve lethality without sacrificing survivability.  The main 
issue with IBA is that the body armor decreases the shoulder pocket Soldiers 
normally use for seating the buttstock of the weapon.  The decreased pocket is 
less stable—or it feels less stable—and Soldiers perceive that it reduces their 
ability to form a stable firing position.  It is possible that a redesign of the IBA 
shoulder portion, one that better stabilizes the buttstock, could mitigate the 
negative effect of IBA. 
Employing the SDM with Body Armor does not mean that he will 
have zero effect on the battlefield.  The data shows that body armor has little to 
no negative effect at ranges less than 200 meters.  In this sense, the SDM will 
have the same capabilities at short range as his peers.  Body armor may become 
an issue when the SDM transitions from conventional ranges (10-200 meters) to 
longer ranges (300-500 meters).  At these ranges, the data suggests that body 
armor may have a negative impact.  No data in this study estimates these 
impacts accurately.  This study does not analyze the issues of SDM 
effectiveness versus his survivability.  If a SDM does wear IBA, and this cause 
him to be less lethal, how does this affect unit performance?  Agent Based 
Modeling (ABM), with the support of this study’s Probability of Hit model, could 
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provide insights into this question.  This study suggests that there is a difference, 
and that this difference changes over the distance of the target.  What is not 
known is how these differences change with posture. 
b. Body Armor Limitations 
The dataset contains contrasting observations for Soldiers with and 
without body armor in both the Prone and Standing postures.  The study does 
not have contrasting data for IBA versus non-IBA in the Foxhole or Kneeling 
postures.  This limits the conclusions of the body armor’s effects over all 
postures.  Testing body armor with these two postures should provide a deeper 
understanding of the impact on all postures.  
In addition to multiple postures, the model needs data from Soldiers 
who trained without body armor.  All Soldiers in this study conducted pre-
marksmanship instruction with IBA.  The effects of body armor may be 
confounded with the effects of this training.  Data with contrasting training would 
provide a better understanding how body armor and training affect Probability of 
Hit. 
2. Effects of Posture 
As discussed above, effects of equipment are interlaced with the effects of 
posture.  The stepwise regression does not find a significant interaction between 
posture and body armor, but it does find significant interactions between posture 
and several other equipment factors.   In particular, the model finds a significant 
interaction between total equipment weight and posture. 
The survey responses in Appendix C have several references to the 
weight of the body armor and posture.  One response said that body armor “is a 
problem when firing from the prone, zeroing, qualifying or long distance shots 
(outside of 250 meters).” (Response 1.12)  Other Soldiers disagreed.  The survey 
does not ask for Soldier height or weight, and it is not possible to determine if 
Soldiers of different dimensions respond differently.  The responses do have a 
general theme, and that is that the body armor influences firing posture choices. 
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A rifleman chooses a firing posture based on the threat, security, and 
mission tempo of a situation.  Soldiers may choose a lower posture, such as the 
Prone position, attempting to minimize their own risk to enemy fire.  The Prone is 
a good posture for avoiding fire, but it is not advantageous to delivering aimed 
fire, especially in the presence of low vegetation.  The alternative is to rise up to 
see better, which before IBA meant exposing the critical organs of the chest and 
torso.  That is not so much the case now with IBA.  Ballistic body armor reduces 
the risk of a lethal hit.  The survey data suggests that rifleman with body armor 
may be more likely to fire from the kneeling position.  They do so because it often 
offers better visibility of terrain and allows quicker movement.  Equipment affects 
behavior, and Soldiers with IBA may be more likely to use the Kneeling posture. 
This study does not look at rifleman behavior or decision making.  The 
models, however, can quantify the effects of that posture choice.  This family of 
models allows parent models to examine the effects of Soldier posture on larger-
scale tactics and unit measures of performance.  For example, a parent 
simulation may show that a unit can seize a urban area faster and with fewer 
casualties when the individual Soldiers with body armor use Kneeling instead of 
Prone firing postures. 
Quantify the utility of Kneeling posture is now possible.  Soldiers in the 
Kneeling posture have a Probability of Hit that is less than but comparable to the 
Prone or Foxhole postures.  The Soldiers in this study were not formally trained 
in the Kneeling position.  How well would they perform if they received the similar 
formal training as the Foxhole and Prone positions?  Estimating final 
performance levels with the current data is not possible, but the Kneeling posture 
may offer equal lethality with better mobility than the traditionally trained 
postures. 
Soldiers will fire from the Kneeling position if the situation requires.  
Current training doctrine treats the Kneeling position as advance techniques—it 
is recommended but not required (FM 3-22.9).  This typically translates into 
neglected or poorly resourced training, as it is not specifically outlined in resorting 
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documents (DA PAM 350-38, 2005).  The aggregate result is that in combat, 
Soldiers use a firing posture without formal training. 
Incorporating the Kneeling posture into standard rifle qualification, or 
replacing Foxhole posture with Kneeling altogether, can capitalize on the 
advantages of body armor.  Training in the Kneeling posture supports offensive 
operations in a manner that the static Foxhole posture does not.  It is faster to 
transition from static firing to forward movement from the Kneeling posture than 
from the Foxhole or Prone position.  There is a place for fighting position 
techniques, but current expeditionary operations in the Global War on Terrorism 
make mobile firing techniques a priority. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
The dataset contains a large number of variables, but it contains only 
limited observations of certain variable types.  These variables should have 
priority for additional experiments. 
1. Night Conditions 
Night conditions require more testing.  The current night observations are 
not indicative of modern rifleman capabilities.  The primary reason is the ambient 
light available during the period of testing.  Under more favorable conditions, 
riflemen can—and are expected to—hit range targets at 250 meters, just 50 
meters short of day-time conditions (FM 3-22.9, 2004).  The one night of testing 
was overcast and without moonlight.  Visibility was not conducive to night 
operations.   
Visibility is a major factor in night operations, and future data would be 
most valuable if it included ambient light conditions.  This information is not part 
of the current dataset. 
2. Kneeling Posture at Short Range  
Having only one posture on the short-range targets limits the current 
model.  One or more additional postures for the short-range targets would 
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improve the model.  Within the postures, Kneeling should have priority for further 
short-range testing.  The next priority is the Prone posture.  A model from three 
postures would be superior to the current model. 
One note about gathering additional data for short-range targets: the Army 
does not have a standardized, automated short-range rifle facility.  As said 
earlier, this study did not collect data for multiple postures due to restrictions on 
the range.  Range Control of Fort Riley was willing to accept hasty coordination 
to make this study possible, but this should not be expected of other facilities.  
Future experiments should conduct deliberate planning far in advance to gain 
access to a Combat Pistol Qualification Range.  
3. Target Movement 
Actual combatants rarely behave like static plastic targets.  The study did 
not have access to a moving target range.  Thus, target movement is not 
included as a factor for Probability of Hit.  This is a critical missing component if 
one hopes to construct a truly realistic PH model.  Follow-on research can be 
improved by adding the effects of target movement into current models. 
One opportunity for gathering this type of data lies with the Engagement 
Skills Trainer (EST) 2000, discussed in Chapter I.  The EST contains moving 
target scenarios for marksmanship training, and these tables offer an 
established, easily implemented method to measure how a target’s movement 
affects a rifleman’s Probability of Hit. 
4. Shooter Movement and Fatigue 
In addition to the movement of the target, the shooter’s movement 
requires measurement.  One assumption of this model is that the rifleman 
remains stationary while shooting.  This is a valid assumption for most scenarios, 
but nothing restricts a shooter from firing while moving.  Shooter movement does 
have an effect on the bullets, but may create a more important effect—fatigue.  
The Soldiers rested prior to firing each table, and it was logical to assume the 
tables were not physically exhausting.  This is not to say that fatigue would not 
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become a factor if they continued to fire for extended periods of time.  Additional 
experiments, therefore, could duplicate the existing tables after prescribed levels 
of activity, perhaps 200 meters of sprinting, 3 kilometers of marching, carrying a 
casualty litter for 100 meters, or digging a fighting position for 5 minutes.  These 
are all plausible activities a Soldier executes immediately prior to a shooting 
engagement.  The test could use percentage of Heart Rate Reserve (HQDA FM 
21-20, 1998) and activity duration as measurements of physical effort. 
C. SUMMARY 
The rifleman is the tip of the spear in the Global War on Terror.  While 
advance technologies aid in sensing and targeting threats, the country sill relies 
on the rifleman to pull those threats out of hiding.  It was the rifleman, and not the 
precision guided-munitions, that brought Saddam Hussein to justice.  In being the 
tip of the spear, riflemen must continue to improve their craft.  If in doing so, our 
riflemen are so lethal that our enemies find it useless to combat them, the 
rifleman may ultimately create a method of preserving lives by convincing the 
enemy to avoid conflict. 
The purpose of this study is to improve rifleman lethality.  Thousands of 
United States servicemembers spend days if not weeks on rifle ranges each year 
to become the best rifleman possible.  They do so because they know their lives 
depend on those skills.  Those servicemembers’ leaders and trainers continually 
look for better methods to train those in their charge.  They march forward with 
the trust that they have the best equipment and training this nation can provide.  
We hope the analysis and models in this thesis help support the improvement of 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL #2 JMP-IN REGRESSION REPORT 
The report below is from JMP-IN for Model #2 for a Mixed Stepwise 
Logistical Regression with α  = 0.10 for both entering and leaving variables.  The 
beginning model uses Target Range, Target Angle, Target Exposure Time and 
Shooter Posture to determine the shooter’s Probability of Hit for the target.  The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test p-value is 8.5%. 
Whole Model Test 
 
Model -LogLikelihood  DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 131.8254 10 263.6508 0.0001 
Full 1824.5773    
Reduced 1956.4027    
    
RSquare (U) 0.0674 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 2930 
 
Lack Of Fit 
 
Source DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 61 110.3015 220.603 
Saturated 71 1714.2758 Prob>ChiSq 




Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -3.4796629 0.3933345 78.26 <.0001 
MILS  -0.0817126 0.0261329 9.78 0.0018 
(MILS-19.7365)*(MILS-19.7365)  -0.0005938 0.0001213 23.97 <.0001 
TIME_EXP  -0.0466416 0.0240419 3.76 0.0524 
(TIME_EXP-6.74676)*(TIME_EXP-6.74676)  0.04653913 0.0068778 45.79 <.0001 
TGT_RANGE  0.00436881 0.0018143 5.80 0.0160 
(TGT_RANGE-118.991)*(TGT_RANGE-118.991)  0.00004813 0.0000112 18.54 <.0001 
POSTURE_ID  1.14165293 0.2085718 29.96 <.0001 
(POSTURE_ID-2.60068)*(MILS-19.7365)  0.07810202 0.0174994 19.92 <.0001 
(POSTURE_ID-2.60068)*(TGT_RANGE-118.991)  0.00296813 0.00084 12.49 0.0004 
(TIME_EXP-6.74676)*(TGT_RANGE-118.991)  -0.0017342 0.0003731 21.60 <.0001 
 
For log odds of 0/1 
 
Effect Wald Tests 
 
Source Nparm DF Wald ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
MILS 1 1 9.7769586 0.0018  
MILS*MILS 1 1 23.9687079 0.0000  
TIME_EXP 1 1 3.76365455 0.0524  
TIME_EXP*TIME_EXP 1 1 45.7866475 0.0000  
TGT_RANGE 1 1 5.79841847 0.0160  
TGT_RANGE*TGT_RANGE 1 1 18.5430509 0.0000  
POSTURE_ID 1 1 29.9610485 0.0000  
POSTURE_ID*MILS 1 1 19.9194325 0.0000  
POSTURE_ID*TGT_RANGE 1 1 12.4859535 0.0004 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL #3 JMP-IN REGRESSION REPORT 
The report below is from JMP-IN for Model #3 for a Mixed Stepwise 
Logistical Regression with α  = 0.10 for both entering and leaving variables.  An 
in-depth description of this model’s variables are available in Chapter IV, Section 
B.1.  This model’s Hosmer-Lemeshow Test p-value is 19.7%. 
 
Whole Model Test 
 
Model -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 427.5732 38 855.1463 <.0001 
Full 1068.4078    
Reduced 1495.9809    
    
RSquare (U) 0.2858 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 2242 
 
Lack Of Fit 
 
Source DF -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 1269 693.6427 1387.285 
Saturated 1307 374.7651  Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 38 1068.4078 0.0110  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare 
Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  -7.3291748 8.6782518 0.71 0.3984 
SOL.HT.M  11.2110147 4.9925877 5.04 0.0247 
Equipment Weight  -0.0290865 0.049185 0.35 0.5543 
(Equipment Weight-21.8686)*(Equipment Weight-21.8686)  -0.0040089 0.0007226 30.77 <.0001 
EQUIP_WT_RATIO  2.29481259 4.2352385 0.29 0.5879 
YEARS_OF_SERVICE  -0.0714946 0.0471364 2.30 0.1293 
MILS  -0.4354926 0.0780598 31.12 <.0001 
TIME_EXP  -0.2555361 0.069226 13.63 0.0002 
TGT_RANGE  -0.0554288 0.0154795 12.82 0.0003 
SPD_MPS  -0.4390262 0.138286 10.08 0.0015 
TEMP_C  -0.1063935 0.0528021 4.06 0.0439 
WIND_DFLX  -1.8166417 0.6666434 7.43 0.0064 
WEAPON{M203-M16&M4}  -2.4371221 0.8102426 9.05 0.0026 
WEAPON{M16-M4}  -7.9653883 1.6956174 22.07 <.0001 
AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}  -6.0735592 1.2437158 23.85 <.0001 
POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE &STAND  -0.4372988 0.2723778 2.58 0.1084 
POSTURE{PRONE &STANDING-SUPPO  1.19053856 0.1667299 50.99 <.0001 
POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING}  -2.3616992 0.2755784 73.44 <.0001 
SING_MULTI[M]  0.35784726 0.0971715 13.56 0.0002 
(M16-M4-0.71365)*(SOL.HT.M-1.77943)  -70.651314 17.039067 17.19 <.0001 
(WEAPON{M203-M16&M4}+0.49866)*(Equipment Weight-21.8686) -0.4686705 0.0821671 32.53 <.0001 
(M16-M4-0.71365)*(EQUIP_WT_RATIO-0.27617)  -88.504139 14.136009 39.20 <.0001 
(M16-M4-0.71365)*(YEARS_OF_SERVICE-3.50691)  -0.5634962 0.1273405 19.58 <.0001 
(M203-M16&M4+0.49866)*(POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING}-0.02409) -0.5157311 0.2307656 4.99 0.0254 
(M203-M16&M4+0.49866)*(TGT_RANGE-108.227)  -0.0094936 0.003339 8.08 0.0045 
(M16-M4-0.71365)*(TGT_RANGE-108.227)  -0.0135488 0.0059365 5.21 0.0225 
(M16-M4-0.71365)*(SPD_MPS-3.6154)  2.08011813 0.3213207 41.91 <.0001 
(AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}+0.80196)*(EQUIP_WT_RATIO-0.27617) -15.72575 3.6135068 18.94 <.0001 
(AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}+0.80196)*(MILS-23.7294) -0.2726197 0.0671159 16.50 <.0001 
(AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}+0.80196)*(TIME_EXP-6.38314) 0.14263793 0.0645893 4.88 0.0272 
(SOL.HT.M-1.77943)*(POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE &STANDING&FOXHOLE }+0.88046) 14.596977 5.9936669 5.93 0.0149 
(Equipment Weight-21.8686)*(POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING}-0.02409) -0.0423996 0.0115953 13.37 0.0003 
(EQUIP_WT_RATIO-0.27617)*(TGT_RANGE-108.227)  0.02121072 0.0084405 6.32 0.0120 
(EQUIP_WT_RATIO-0.27617)*(TEMP_C-5.04064)  -2.6110715 0.4211145 38.44 <.0001 
(YEARS_OF_SERVICE-3.50691)*(POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE&STANDING&FOXHOLE }+0.88046) 0.22741307 0.0906685 6.29 0.0121 
(POSTURE{PRONE-STANDING}-0.02409)*(TIME_EXP-6.38314)  0.20382839 0.0553648 13.55 0.0002 
(POSTURE{PRONE-STANDING}-0.02409)*(WIND_DFLX-0.25081)  0.94752142 0.4531221 4.37 0.0365 
(MILS-23.7294)*(TGT_RANGE-108.227)  -0.0032452 0.0007088 20.96 <.0001 
(WIND_DFLX-0.25081)*(SPD_MPS-3.6154)  0.57553756 0.2009002 8.21 0.0042 
 




Effect Wald Tests 
 
Source Nparm DF Wald ChiSquare  Prob>ChiSq   
SOL.HT.M 1 1 5.0424133 0.0247  
Equipment Weight 1 1 0.34971724 0.5543  
Equipment Weight*Equipment Weight 1 1 30.7746406 0.0000  
EQUIP_WT_RATIO 1 1 0.29358828 0.5879  
YEARS_OF_SERVICE 1 1 2.30055924 0.1293  
MILS 1 1 31.124808 0.0000  
TIME_EXP 1 1 13.6259358 0.0002  
TGT_RANGE 1 1 12.8220945 0.0003  
SPD_MPS 1 1 10.0791617 0.0015  
TEMP_C 1 1 4.06001513 0.0439  
WIND_DFLX 1 1 7.42593944 0.0064  
WEAPON{M203 Grenade Launcher-M16A2/4 Rifle&M4 MWS  } 1 1 9.04741327 0.0026  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  } 1 1 22.067757 0.0000  
AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT} 1 1 23.847577 0.0000  
POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE &STAND 1 1 2.57758698 0.1084  
POSTURE{PRONE &STANDING-SUPPO 1 1 50.9870881 0.0000  
POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING} 1 1 73.444431 0.0000  
SING_MULTI 1 1 13.5617963 0.0002  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  }*SOL.HT.M 1 1 17.1928893 0.0000  
WEAPON{M203 Grenade Launcher-M16A2/4 Rifle&M4 MWS  }*Equipment Weight 1 1 32.5341681 0.0000  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  }*EQUIP_WT_RATIO 1 1 39.1988702 0.0000  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  }*YEARS_OF_SERVICE 1 1 19.5816362 0.0000  
WEAPON{M203 Grenade Launcher-M16A2/4 Rifle&M4 MWS  }*POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING} 1 1 4.99464395 0.0254  
WEAPON{M203 Grenade Launcher-M16A2/4 Rifle&M4 MWS  }*TGT_RANGE 1 1 8.08421275 0.0045  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  }*TGT_RANGE 1 1 5.20877768 0.0225  
WEAPON{M16A2/4 Rifle-M4 MWS  }*SPD_MPS 1 1 41.9081696 0.0000  
AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}*EQUIP_WT_RATIO 1 1 18.9393456 0.0000  
AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}*MILS 1 1 16.4992532 0.0000  
AIM_DEVICE{OTHER-M68CCO&IRONSIGHT}*TIME_EXP 1 1 4.87695947 0.0272  
SOL.HT.M*POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE &STANDING&FOXHOLE } 1 1 5.93117371 0.0149  
Equipment Weight*POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING} 1 1 13.3707977 0.0003  
EQUIP_WT_RATIO*TGT_RANGE 1 1 6.31508723 0.0120  
EQUIP_WT_RATIO*TEMP_C 1 1 38.4447509 0.0000  
YEARS_OF_SERVICE*POSTURE{KNEELING-PRONE&STANDING&FOXHOLE } 1 1 6.29097036 0.0121  
POSTURE{PRONE -STANDING}*TIME_EXP 1 1 13.5538411 0.0002  
POSTURE{PRONE POSTUURE-STANDING}*WIND_DFLX 1 1 4.37267828 0.0365  
MILS*TGT_RANGE 1 1 20.9632671 0.0000  
WIND_DFLX*SPD_MPS 1 1 8.20704113 0.0042 
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APPENDIX C: COMBAT VETERAN SURVEY RESPONSES 
The questions and responses below were submitted by veterans of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  They are the basis for several “conventional wisdom” 
remarks in the study regarding the effects of body armor and posture.  The 
responses are generally unedited except for spelling and to clarify acronyms.  
Responses are grouped by question and annotated by responder (e.g. Response 
2.1 is the answer to Question 2 from Subject 1.) 




Rank Duty Position Years of 
Service 
1 Staff Sergeant   Battalion Master Gunner 16 
2 Captain Company Commander 12 
3 Master Sergeant Live Fire Operation NCOIC 22 
4 Private First Class Grenadier 1 
5 Specialist SAW Gunner 2 
6 Sergeant Team Leader 2.5 
7 Private First Class Grenadier 1 
8 Staff Sergeant Squad Leader 6 
9 Private First Class Grenadier 1 
10 Private First Class Mortarman 1.5 
11 Staff Sergeant Squad Leader 6 
12 First Lieutenant Platoon Leader 2 
13 Sergeant Team Leader 4 
14 Captain Company Trainer 18 
15 Private First Class Assistant Gunner 1 
16 First Lieutenant Platoon Leader 11 
17 Major Battalion Operations Officer 16 
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2. QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES 
Question 1: The conflicts of the IBA with rear SAPI plate and the PASGT 
Helmet are well documented, and the modified profile of the ACH was 
design to correct this.  In your opinion, how does the current system of 
Kevlar armor equipment (helmets and body equipment) affect your skill of 
shooting a rifle? 
1.1   “Most soldiers place the weapon on the meaty portion of the shoulder. The design of the 
IBA doesn’t allow the Butt Stock to be placed in the shoulder pocket during Prone Fire. Kneeling 
and Standing Positions have shown no abnormal firing problems.” 
1.2  “I was a Company CDR w/ the 3d ACR in Iraq in both Ramadi and Fallujha.  We had the 
IBA and the old style K pot.  IBA w/ both plates in is bulky and heavy considering all the other 
stuff we carry.  The new helmet seems much better but we did not have them.  We wore the IBA 
and K pot 24x7 and only took it off when sleeping ( a few hrs daily).” 
1.3  “Because of the bulk of the equipment it is hard to get a good shoulder fire position. It’s 
good for a quick fire or firing at a short distance. But good aim sight you must have 4 basic of 
Marksmanship. It can protect you from a round or fragments. “ 
1.4  “In my overall analysis, the ACH is an effective alternative to the previous Kevlar.  In 
contrast, the ACH provides comfortable heads cushions and proper visibility.  This furnishes a 
better environment for proper shooting, complimenting a natural head movement.  However, the 
IBA still has some issues that cause discomfort while firing.  The IBA tends to be ill-fitting, choking 
the neck with the throat protector, thus leading to uneasiness that hinder proper shooting.” 
1.6  “The Kevlar is still pushed up by the IBA, so it is hard to see.” 
1.7  “In the prone position, the IBA system makes shooting difficult.” 
1.8  “I felt the ACH worked well with the IBA in the prone.” 
1.9  “The only problem I encountered was shooting from the prone and keeping or finding a 
good pocket in my shoulder to fire from.” 
1.10 “I find that firing from the prone is still difficult with the existing system of Kevlar armor 
equipment.  The rear SAPI plate prevents me from raising my head high enough to see an 
accurate sight picture without much strain and effort.” 
1.11 “My squads’ shooting skills, it has not.  Allowing us to move and shoot has not been a 
problem.  Laying in the prone and firing can be a problem, but the only time we ever firing from 
the prone is zeroing/qualifying or when assaulting a bunker or trench at Fort Bragg.” 
1.12 “The current Kevlar system does not affect close quarters or short-rante shooting (inside 
of 200 meters).  It is a problem when firing from the prone, zeroing, qualifying or long distance 
shots (outside of 250 meters).” 
1.13 “From my experience, the IBA actually help improve the shooting by creating a better 
pocket for the buttstock.  The ACHs only affect is that it loosens up very quickly.” 
1.15 “It’s too bulky, it needs to be slimmed down.” 
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1.17 “No issues.  ACH doesn’t conflict with IBA or shooting, provided troopers do the Live Fire 
Exercise training with the IBA and ACH.” 
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Question 2: In a combat situation, how did having body armor affect a 
soldier’s behavior?  Did he choose different firing postures, fighting 
positions, routes than he would if he did not have body armor?  Did it make 
him more or less aggressive/confident in his ability to hit a target, and 
why? 
2.1  “Soldiers chose to fire from the Kneeling and Standing positions more often due to the 
distance that they were off of the ground. The only time I saw soldiers in the prone was when they 
were on the side of a hill or mound. We chose to move in a more open area, and high speed 
avenues of approach, the bulk that we had prevented us from maneuvering through “tight” 
spaces, and over obstacles.” 
2.2  “After getting a few guys shot, we all saw how effective the IBA was and the K pots saved a 
few lives.  The additional wt and bulk, however, tired the guys down quicker and forced more H20 
consumption.  We got the IBA only a short time before deploying and didn’t train wearing both 
plates.  Suggest units wear / shoot / train with IBA and all equipment before deploying to get used 
to the bulk and added weight.” 
2.3  “Because he has the IBA or its rep’s I feel the soldiers is more apt to think he cannot be 
hurt. But he also knows that he’s not Superman. Looking at some of the firing positions I have 
seen soldiers use. Like standing or kneeing in the open area or standing in the middle of the road, 
when there is a vehicle that he could get cover from.” 
2.4  “In a combat situation, the body armor seems to build soldier’s confidence.  Enabling 
soldiers to perform their military duties with more aggressiveness to hit their targets.  Also, giving 
opportunities to take routes and firing positions that normally would not be taken without the body 
armor.” 
2.5  “He might have gotten tired of constantly wearing the body armor.  He chooses firing 
postures that were appropriate.  I don’t thing the IBA makes a Soldier more or less aggressive.” 
2.6  “The IBA makes you feel a little more sure of yourself.” 
2.7  “Wearing the IBA brought confidence and assurance that wouldn’t be thought of or felt if 
a Soldier would not be wearing it.” 
2.8  “My firing positions didn’t change at all, but having the additional armor did make me feel 
more confident.” 
2.9  “For the most part, confidence was up, but I don’t think it affected decision making.” 
2.10 “The body armor improved most Soldiers’ confidence of safety.  They were less likely to 
shoot from the prone without being instructed to do so.  With the increased confidence also came 
more aggressiveness.” 
2.11 “It made Soldiers more confident.  All shots were taken while moving, standing still or on 
a knee.  Aggressiveness had more to do with the mission type—not the IBA.  To tell you the truth, 
his ability to hit targets while firing a rifle was not so much affected.  Pistol shooting would cause 
a problem because you can’t roll your shoulders forward due to the design of the IBA.” 
2.12 “Body armor does not affect a Soldier’s behavior or routes traveled.  It does encourage 
non-prone firing positions.  Kevlar body armor does increase a Soldier’s aggressiveness and 
sense of being indestructible.” 
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2.13 “No, Soldiers react on instinct, firing position changes because of the equipment.” 
2.15 “More confident.” 
2.16 “Prone positions are a little cumbersome.  You tend to lean off to the non-firing side.” 
2.17 “Shooting positions: Obviously there are steady-hold issues with IBA.  IBA and ACH had 
no impact on my actions under fire—you’re just as scared with or without it.” 
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Question 3: Were there situations when not wearing body armor (both 
helmet and IBA) was preferred to wearing it?  Were there instances when a 
soldier would drop his body armor while in a combat situation, such as to 
run down a suspect? 
3.1  “Soldiers NEVER dropped their IBA. On a few occasions soldiers took off the ACH to 
facilitate seeing through a window without being seen.” 
3.2  “Always wore helmet and IBA.  It’s bulky and heavy but saves lives.  Had three guys lose 
legs, but all shots to the body were protected by the body armor.  We had one soldier hit in the 
chest close range w/ 7.62mm, it left an impression of his dog tag on his chest and knocked him 
down, but did not cause serious injury.” 
3.3  “No, I think you can wear it when chancing a suspect. You will get hot and tried in it, but I feel 
a person can do his mission with it on. Now on the other hand, if I need to do a good shot, I 
wouldn’t want to wear it because you cannot get a firm position with it on. (i.e.…shoulder to butt 
stock)” 
3.4  “Circumstances such as going to the port-a-john with body armor is not a favorite method 
amidst soldiers.  Yet, the training provided before-hand with the body armor, makes running with 
the equipment bearable, appropriately letting Soldiers run down a suspect with minimal 
hesitation.” 
3.6  “Always wore body armor.” 
3.7  “There was never a time, in a combat situation, that the IBA and/or helmet were not 
worn.” 
3.8  “While in a sniper position for extended times, it would be preferred to remove the IBA 
and ACH.  As far as speed goes, yes, it does affect your mobility.” 
3.9  “The only place I would have wanted to drop the armor would be while in observations 
posts (OPs).  No.” 
3.10 “There were times when Soldiers were posted inside buildings for OPs.  The long hours 
of concealment caused many Soldiers to remove the body armor for comfort.  In direct combat 
situations, no one removed their body armor.” 
3.11 “The only time you would not be wearing your body armor was in a safe zone.  There 
were not instances when one of my Soldiers would drop his IBA while in a  combat situation to 
run down a suspect.” 
3.12 “Paratroopers never shed their body armor in a combat situation.  The only situations 
when body armor came off was within the Green Zone, within the Forward Operation Bases 
(FOBs) and inside or within 5 meters of a building that was inside a secured area (i.e. fire base).” 
3.13 “No, there was no need.” 
3.17 “ No.  Snipers preferred to drop all for accuracy.  Additionally, they cannot stalk in IBA 
and ACH.  No time to drop equipment in contact.  Again, you do what you always do (as you’ve 
trained).” 
  85
Question 4: Did the body armor (both helmet and IBA) affect the use of the 
M16A4 or M4 MWS and its sub-systems (M68 CCO, PEQ-2A, etc)?  Were 
there retraining issues involved with operating with body armor, such as 
modifying the shoulder stock position? 
4.1  “We went with what we had and trained our soldiers to pay closer attention to butt stock 
placement. “ 
4.2   “Soldiers carried their weapons at the low ready more often on patrols b/c the bulk.  
Larger framed guys had an easier time than shorter soldiers.  M68, PEQ- 2/ 4 and Nods not 
affected directly, but sight pictures may be different with the armor on vs. off.” 
4.3  “Yes, it does.” 
4.4  “There is not a significant concern with the body armor affecting the use of the M16A4 or 
M4 MWS and its sub-systems to be noted.” 
4.6  “Yes, the M4 slides off at the soldier.” 
4.7  “Only in the prone position would the body armor would affect the quality of the shot.” 
4.8  “No.  One improvement would be to have more MOLLE-type strapping, especially in the 
middle and higher in front.  It would be far superior if it could be put on and removed “bib” style 
(Velcro and straps on the shoulders and sides)”. 
4.9  “There was little to no interference.” 
4.10 “No.  The only conflict was firing the rifle from the prone, as previously mentioned.” 
4.11 “Effects were not noticed while firing at enemy targets.  There are some movement 
issues due to the design.  The entire weight rests on your shoulders.  The way you close it with 
Velcro in the front isn’t the best idea but we’re not going to see any changes in our kits due to my 
comments.  If we want to develop a better system, lets grab some of us guys that operate in it 
and let them from a better system.” 
4.12 “The subsystems on the M4 were not affected by the body armor.  Reference answer #1 
also.  The shoulder stock position is changed to the pectoral muscle area instead of the ‘armpit’.  
This is done because the IBA edge cuts through the ‘armpit’ stock-well position.” 
4.13 “No retraining involved.” 
4.14 “The sitting firing posture is one that should be trained.  Several NCOs said that it is 
possible to move in and out of this position as quickly as the prone, and it is more accurate when 
trained.  I thought it was [non-sense] until they showed me.  The kneeling posture is quicker to 
get out of, but as far as accuracy, the sitting position is better.” 
4.17 “Yes.  I used to leave the M4 butt fully extended.  No with IBA, I leave it in the second 
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If testing against known standard, ,
where corresponds to an element in the set of target distances, ,
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